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ABSTRACT 
The Indian navy has undergone several periods of expansion in its short history 
which have signaled significant change in the Indian Ocean region.  It is currently 
undergoing another.  This thesis examines the current expansion, and interprets it in light 
of the Indian navy’s maritime strategy.  It focuses on three elements critical to all 
strategy, but which are especially relevant in this case: national interests, perceived 
threats and naval capabilities.  A change in any of the three elements usually signals and 
requires analogous change at the strategic level.  This thesis reveals that there has been an 
increase in all three elements, which forecasts an immense increase in India’s strategic 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE  
On October 16th, 2006, the Indian navy declared it had established its first ever 
maritime strategy.  Though this is the initial installment of a maritime strategy, Indian 
strategy has been expanding since India’s partition from the British Empire.  India 
appears poised to assume greater control of the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and South 
Asia through an expansion of its maritime strategy.  This strategy remains classified and 
therefore presents a problem to those who require an interpretation of Indian intentions. 
Though this document is classified, its contents are undoubtedly the product of a near 
universal strategic calculus which reflects, however imperfectly, India’s national 
interests, perceived threats and military capabilities.  According to its Naval Chief, 
Admiral Arun Prakash, the Indian navy is no longer “China or Pakistan centric” and now 
must “take into account the matrix of economic interests, military threats and other 
national interests” which has caused an expansion in the Indian navy.1  This is just one of 
the many changes to India’s strategic calculus.  In order to more fully explain the 
expansion of India’s maritime strategy and present a current view of that strategy, I will 
examine its national interests, perceived threats and capabilities. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The Indian Ocean is an important resource as the third largest body of water on 
earth, providing the major sea routes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia 
with Europe and the western hemisphere.  The security of this region has great economic 
and political implications.  Through its waters pass an abundance of petroleum and 
petroleum products from the oilfields of the Persian Gulf and Indonesia.  An estimated 40 
percent of the world's offshore oil production comes from the Indian Ocean.2  South Asia 
ranks among the world's most densely-populated regions, containing almost 1.6 billion 
people - about a quarter of all the people in the world.  The stability and security in South 
Asia has been in flux over the last half century as the region went through a wave of  
                                                 
1 ”Indian navy to be Balanced in Ten Years”, http://www.india-defence.com/reports/2299 (Accessed 
November 2006). 




democratization that is yet to be completed.  Wars in this region have been fought over 
territory, resources and religion.  The combination of all these factors provides a view of 
relative instability and insecurity.   
Is India, in partnership with the United States, ready to play a significant role in 
meeting the challenges of the emerging maritime threats resident in the IOR?  In July 
2005, President Bush announced his intention to increase cooperation with India in two 
very important areas – civilian nuclear technology and military cooperation.  This 
announcement signaled the acknowledgement by the United States, that it recognized 
India as a regional power.3  In August 2005, the Chief of Naval Operations for the United 
States Navy appeared ready to take advantage in the increased military cooperation 
between India and the United States when he called for the creation of a “1000-ship 
navy” to better provide security of the global maritime environment by improving 
cooperation among the navies of “all freedom-loving nations, standing watch over the 
seas, standing watch over each other.”4    India’s own maritime capabilities would have a 
great impact on its ability to join this effort and those capabilities are dependent upon 
India’s maritime strategy.  
Managing the security and stability of the IOR is a key requirement for India and 
in the formulation of its maritime strategy.  Strategic thought has not been considered a 
great strength of this emerging economic and military power.5  It is also deficient of a 
system to enable access to official documents and thereby promote serious scholarship on 
government policy.6  This combination of practices has forced Indian leadership to be 
largely reactive to its regional and international security environment and thereby 
provided an air of strategic ambiguity to the global community.  Historically, unexplained 
growth and strategic ambiguity often lead to conflict, especially in a region as sensitive as 
                                                 
3 “U.S. Acknowledges India as Regional Force”, www.jinsa.org/articles/view.html?documentid=3093 
(Accessed November 2006).  
4 “New U.S. Navy Chief Wants ‘1000-ship’ International Navy”, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1076711&C=navwar (Accessed November 2006).  
5 George K. Tanham, Securing India, Manohar Publishers, 1996.  
6 PM of India, Monmohan Singh, April 18, 2006 Speech on the release of Jagat Mehta’s book.  He 
hoped to encourage a 30 or 50 year rule to declassify information to improve Indian strategic thought and 
promote long-term thinking about strategic matters. 
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South and Southeast Asia where a convergence of strategic spheres of influence by the 
United States, India, and China reside.  India’s continued naval expansion will inevitably 
affect U.S., Chinese and Pakistani decision making in the future and therefore must be 
considered at this time.  Gaining a better understanding of the critical components of 
Indian maritime strategy is a step toward reducing strategic uncertainty and thereby 
contributes toward greater security and stability.  In addition, with this information at 
hand, political and military decision-makers will be much more informed as to the 
intentions of Indian leadership as it attempts to increase the cooperation between these 
two countries and their respective armed forces. 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The historical literature on the Indian maritime strategy is limited, chiefly owing 
to lack of access to relevant documents.  The most thorough studies of Indian maritime 
strategy include works by Panikkar, Harrison and Subrahmanyam, and Roy-Chaudhury.  
While these works provide very detailed examinations of India’s maritime security 
interests and the overall strategic picture at that time, none of these authors have analyzed 
the structural components of India’s maritime strategy in that context and therefore 
cannot provide a detailed account of the basis for the development of Indian maritime 
strategy.  In addition very little detailed work has been completed since the middle of the 
1990’s, which does not consider the changes to the Indian strategic calculus.   
The first work examined is by K. M. Panikkar, a renowned historian with 
significant diplomatic experience in the post-independence period examines India’s 
strategic picture in that period with a view toward the need for developing greater defense 
capabilities than economic development and growth.  Panikkar’s notable work on the 
subject is contained in his 1945 book7 on the influence of sea power, and his 1960 book,8 
which dedicates a chapter to naval strategy.  He provides a sound and rationale argument 
for expanding India’s naval forces, especially given the strategic picture of that time.  
While his work was the foundational piece which indicated India’s quest to develop its 
naval force during the post-independence period, India’s recent ascendancy in economic 
and political terms has made his work largely irrelevant in today’s world. 
                                                 
7 K. M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1945. 
8 K. M. Panikkar, Problems of Indian Defense, Asia Publishing House, 1960. 
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K. Subrahmanyam, one of India’s top strategic thinkers and former Director of 
Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, has contributed many written 
works on the subject of Indian security over the years.  His most notable work is his 1989 
co-authored book on the security of the Indian Ocean in the Cold War years.9  He also 
provides a detailed examination of the Indian response to the strategic picture, much of 
which is based upon the elements of sea power promoted by Mahan and not really 
relevant to the naval strategy in the context this thesis seeks to explore. 
The most thorough and revealing work is by Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, a policy 
analyst with extensive experience in intelligence assessment, threat analysis and national 
security planning for the government of India.  His published works are primarily 
centered on issues of Indian defense.  Roy-Chaudhury’s 1995 book on the value of sea 
power for India.  He provides a very detailed overview of the growth and expansion of 
the Indian navy up to the late 1980’s, in response to India’s perceived threats.10  He also 
examines the cause/effect relationship between India and its adversaries which will 
undoubtedly continue to have utility in the current period.  Unfortunately, a threat-based 
analysis only explains a portion of India’s maritime history.  This thesis contends that its 
current strategy accounts for not just the threat element, but also the element of interests 
and capabilities.  
The most recent literature on India’s maritime strategy leaves gaps in 
understanding.  India’s national interests or capabilities, thereby promoting the continued 
belief in a threat-based strategy.  The current literature on Indian maritime strategy 
includes works by Berlin, Prakash and Roy.  
The first work examined is by Donald Berlin, a strategic analyst with experience 
in intelligence assessment, threat analysis and national security planning for the United 
States. The focus of his work is primarily centered on issues in the IOR.  His notable 
work on Indian maritime strategy is contained in an article in the Naval War College 
                                                 
9 Selig Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam, Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, Oxford University 
Press, 1989. 
10 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power and Indian Security, Brasseys, 1995. 
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Review.11  While he does not spell out the Indian maritime strategy he does provide an 
overview of Indian interests in the Indian Ocean by examining its relations with key 
powers and some of the elements of Indian maritime capability to support its strategy.  
His examination is an outside-in perspective, which relates what responses should be 
taken by others as a result of Indian developments; whereas I am looking to underscore 
the Indian response to its internal and external realities and developments.   
 The second work examined is by Admiral Arun Prakash, the Indian Navy’s 
current Chief of Naval Staff.  His notable work on the Indian maritime strategy is 
contained in an article entitled, “Future Strategy and Challenges for the Indian Navy.”12  
In this article he briefly mentions India’s objectives and naval capabilities, but does not 
really provide any depth to the argument.  This article spurned my interest in the subject 
and underscores the importance of providing more depth and clarity in order to better 
understand the Indian rationale for its decisions.  
The final work examined is by Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, the editor of the Journal 
of Indian Ocean Studies.  Roy wrote a paper originally entitled the “Changing Face of 
India’s Maritime Strategy.”13  In this paper he examines the role of the navy in India’s 
maritime strategy but fails to really address the issue of Indian maritime strategy.   
Each of the previous works provided a different route to understanding India’s 
maritime strategy.  I believe in order to fully understood, a better understanding of the 
current India’s interests, threats and capabilities is necessary.  As such, it is with this 
concept in mind that I will try to more fully explain India’s maritime strategy.   
D. ORGANIZATION  
I will begin with a historical survey of India’s maritime strategy and its 
development over time.  This chapter primarily serves as background information, but is 
essential to fully understand the evolution of Indian maritime strategy.  The span of 
                                                 
11 Donald L. Berlin, “India in the Indian Ocean” in Naval War College Review, vol. 59, no.2, Spring 
2006, 58-89. 
12 Arun Prakash, “Future Strategy and Challenges for the Indian Navy” in the Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence and Security Studies Defence Systems, Vol. 8, No.2, November 2005, 31-33.  
13  This article was originally entitled “The Changing Face of Maritime Strategy, but has since been 
changed to “Maritime Security in South West Asia”.  Mihir Roy, “Maritime Security in South West Asia” 
obtained from the Institute for International Policy Studies website at http://www.iips.org/Roy-paper.pdf 
(Accessed July 2006).   
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Indian history is divided into four eras in order to better explain the critical factors which 
most contributed toward the expansion of Indian maritime strategy in each of the eras.   
The next section examines India’s strategic position in order to better understand 
how India is placed in the international system which will inevitably affect India’s 
maritime strategy and its expansion.   
The next section examines India’s national interests in order to determine if its 
national interests – independent of the perennial requirements of self defense - are 
changing in the current era.   In this sense, “interest” may be considered synonymous 
with “aspiration” or “ambition.”   If India’s strategic outlook is best explained by an 
expansion of such interests, it will contribute to a strategy that emphasizes those interests 
despite a changing threat environment.     
The next section examines India’s perceived threats.  This is revealed through an 
examination of the traditional and non-traditional threats to Indian interests.  If Indian 
strategy is best explained by an increased perception of threat, it will promote a strategic 
response to those threats and thereby emphasize a specific set of force capabilities.  
The next section examines India’s maritime capabilities in order to determine if 
it’s overall maritime capabilities are expanding in the current era.  This will be achieved 
by first examining the factors that contribute towards its maritime capabilities and then 
determining if those capabilities are increasing.  If India’s strategic expansion is best 
explained by an expansion of its capabilities, it will contribute to a strategy that will 
emphasize its strengths.   
I will conclude with a review of the historical and current structural components 
from previous chapters in order to unlock India’s maritime strategy and reveal which of 
the examined elements most contribute to its current strategic expansion.   
E. SOURCES 
Primary sources that reveal a country’s current strategic calculus are normally 
unattainable, but some countries have implemented systems to selectively declassify 
official documents in order to provide justification for its policy decisions.  India has 
never implemented a system of declassification of its official documents, but since 
making a more complete democratic transition, it has been more transparent in the release 
7 
of annual reports, which do reveal some of its strategic preferences.  By incorporating 
these newly released documents, I hope to better explain the Indian strategic calculus.  It 
is important to emphasize that even with these documents, a complete understanding of 
India’s strategic calculus is still imperfect.  For secondary sources which reveal the 
Indian strategic calculus I investigated the works of scholars and journalists which 
scrutinize government policies, and are available in numerous publicly available journals 
and websites.  
For primary sources which reveal India’s perceived threats and national interests, 
I investigated official policy documents and speeches available via India’s official 
government websites.  For secondary sources which reveal India’s perceived threats and 
national interests, I investigated literature by leading academic scholars and journalists in 
publicly available books, articles and websites. 
For primary sources which reveal India’s capabilities, I investigated numerous 
Indian government websites which detail its economic investment, technologic capability 
and industrial capability. For secondary sources which reveal Indian maritime 
capabilities, I investigated numerous security organizations assessments of Indian 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIAN MARITIME STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Indian Navy has been built and developed over the previous half century with 
a vision of protecting India’s economic, political and security interests.  It has become a 
naval force more capable than any other in the South Asia region.  The decision to build a 
large naval force is ever an easy one, for the financial investment necessary to develop 
and maintain it is often times immense in comparison to the political and military payoff.  
To the Indians it was deemed necessary, as sea power was critical to the prosperity and 
security of India because of the two dominant geographical features of India; the lofty 
mountain ranges of the Himalayas; and India’s extensive coastline.  In combination, they 
require that Indians be deeply concerned with the sea.  “Since the mountains are nearly 
impassable, almost everything must enter India by sea.”14   
It is with this concept in mind that we view Indian maritime strategy.   The Indian 
maritime strategy is designed to respond to a range of external threats and safeguard 
India’s economic, political and security interests in the maritime domain, with a 
purposefully-designed set of maritime capabilities.  The circumstances India is faced with 
today are different from those it has faced in the past, but the historical evolution of that 
maritime strategy is important, because it reveals the various approaches to maritime 
strategy that India has adopted over the course of its history.  Thus, the purpose of this 
chapter is to highlight how India’s external threats, its national interests and the 
development of its naval capabilities impacted its maritime strategy over the course of its 
history.  It will reveal the priority India has assigned to its maritime security and types of 
strategies that India has pursued in response to the maritime security threats.  The span of 
Indian history has been divided into four eras in order to more easily define the changes.   
B. THE ERA OF ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (1947-1962) 
In the aftermath of India’s independence, Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned India as a 
great power and set about to rebuild India in that mold.  Nehru dismissed many of the 
                                                 
14 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Sea Power and Indian Security, Brassey’s, 1995, 13. 
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external threats to India in favor of economic reconstruction,15 though by the 1962 Sino-
Indian War his neglect of the armed forces would almost bring India to its knees.  Indian 
maritime strategy was developed over this period to serve both Indian and British 
interests, but the emergence of India’s external threats, and British refusal to get 
involved, served to highlight India’s need to address its security problems on its own.  
1. Threats 
The overall threat to Indian maritime security during this era was considered 
insignificant.  The British navy had protected colonial India’s maritime interests in the 
past and Nehru remained confident that a free India was secure against attack because of 
its geo-strategic position, size, and the balance of power.16  Therefore, defense planning 
was primarily for internal defense against the “untamed tribes on the frontier” and 
internal rebellion.17  India would utilize the power of the British Army and the Royal 
Navy to maintain its security in the post-Independence period.  It was not until China 
shattered this belief that India truly experienced its independence and the vulnerability 
that comes with it.   
The maritime threat from Pakistan did not represent a threat to the survival of the 
Indian government.  The Pakistani threat was viewed as limited to Kashmir and did not 
present a real threat to the Indian center.  Pakistan, in the early years of its existence, was 
incapable of conducting a major attack, though India did realize that the threat from 
Pakistan would continue to evolve.  Given that Pakistan’s only line of communication 
was around India and over the seas, India believed this condition would compel Pakistan 
to build a formidable navy.18  A Pakistani buildup would in turn require India to expand 
its capabilities to respond to that threat, but Nehru believed India’s security was intact in 
the near term and would enable him to concentrate on its economic buildup.   
The threat from China was considered more worthy and acceptable due to its size, 
population and history as a great civilization but the actual maritime threat was still 
                                                 
15 Jagat S. Bright, Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Printing Works, 1951, 138 and 
153. 
16 Lorne Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947-1965, University of California 
Press, 1967. 23. 
17 K. M. Panikkar, Problems of Indian Defense, Asia Publishing House, 1960, 45.  
18 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1945, 83. 
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remote.19  Indian strategists were aware of China’s maritime tradition and its recent 
expansion into the Indonesian archipelago, and they also believed that in time China 
could develop a great maritime force which could threaten India’s maritime interests; but 
neither presented India with a need to respond immediately.20  This reinforced the belief 
that India had time to build up its military capabilities with a meager allocation towards 
its maritime security forces.   
The threat from the Soviet Union between 1947 and 1962 was effectively 
dismissed by Nehru who believed the threat from the Soviet Union was ‘largely 
imaginary’.21  India contained neither the capital nor the machinery that the Soviet Union 
required to rebuild itself.  Thus, India maintained an open relationship with the Soviet 
Union that would prove beneficial in the years to come.  
The threat from the other two Asian maritime powers, the United States and 
Japan, between 1947 and 1962 was also viewed as remote.  The United States was too far 
away and was closely aligned with Britain, which provided a certain guarantee of its 
security.  Japan was devastated in the World War and the United States was ensuring that 
Japan was unable to threaten its Asian neighbors for the immediate future.  
2. Interests 
In the wake of independence, India was an abysmally poor and defenseless nation 
whose primary goal was to pursue rapid economic development and thereby provide its 
indigent masses a life on a scale above the traditional one of bare subsistence.22  Nehru 
believed that India required a vast economic and industrial expansion in order to provide 
for its people and therefore sought to follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union which 
provided one of the dominant models for economic expansion.  The Soviet Union had 
undergone significant economic development in the period before and during the war, 
and this was believed by many to demonstrate that the USSR had devised the most 
efficient means for a large nation to provide to its masses.   
                                                 
19 George K. Tanham, Securing India, Manohar Publishers, 1996, 59.  
20 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1945, 86.  
21 Lorne Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947-1965, University of California 
Press, 1967, 23. 
22 Lorne Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947-1965, University of California 
Press, 1967, 39.  
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India did maintain a firm belief in the security of the Indian Ocean and saw that as 
a critical requirement for its future security.  India had been shown time and again 
throughout history that when it neglected its maritime security, the subcontinent was put 
at great risk.  The Chinese invaded in the 15th century and the British in the 17th 
Century.  Each represented a period of significant decline in maritime security and 
eventually led to Indian colonization by the British.  Thus the need to address its 
maritime security interests was recognized.  Given the overwhelming importance 
assigned to problems of internal security, maritime strategy was assigned as a lower 
priority in the near term yet it remained a long term goal of the nation to build up its 
naval forces to properly safeguard it from external threats.  
An additional interest of India for its navy during this period was the process of 
‘Indianization” of its navy.  After partition it did not represent a totally Indian force, as 
almost all of its top leadership and most of its strategic planning was conducted by the 
British.23  These plans would lay the foundation for the structure and mission of the 
Indian navy in the early years of independent rule, but they were hardly conceived for 
India’s benefit.  Rather they echoed the British Admiralty’s desire for the Indian navy to 
contribute to the defense of the Commonwealth.  The movement of Indian personnel into 
the senior ranks would enable India to pursue its own interests and assume greater 
responsibility of strategic planning.24  The Indian navy did not complete this transition 
until 1958 when an Indian finally assumed the role of Indian navy service chief.25 
3. Capabilities 
By the time of British withdrawal in 1947, India had the nucleus of a navy.  Since 
the 1920’s it had been a subsidiary arm of the Royal navy and after the partition of the 
subcontinent and the Royal Indian Naval force, India possessed four sloops, two frigates, 
one corvette, twelve minesweepers, four tankers and a few auxiliary vessels.26  The new 
state did not possess a single Indian officer above the rank of Commander.27  At first 
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look, it appeared a very meager force, but that was in relation to the great naval powers.  
When considering this force in relation to India’s regional neighbors, it does represent a 
significant force.  Despite its shortcomings, India’s leadership believed the navy was 
capable of providing for its minimal requirements for the time being.  But India did 
promote a more balanced force of all types of units- cruisers, destroyers, frigates, 
minesweeper, aircraft carriers, submarines and torpedo boats, rather than just the missing 
bits of a larger naval scheme.28  It was this interest that drove a wedge between Britain 
and the Indian leadership.  They could not come to a compromise and this forced India to 
seek greater aid from the Soviet Union which was more than happy to help the Indians.   
4. Maritime Strategy 
Due to financial constraints and the continued presence of the British in the Indian 
Ocean between 1947 and 1962, Nehru chose to pursue a fiscal-based maritime strategy.29  
India was an extremely poor country that clearly did not have the economic or military 
capabilities to secure its maritime interests on its own.  Nehru sought to utilize India’s 
political alliances to better secure its interests.  The British Army and the Royal Navy 
remained in the region and Nehru believed this to be a virtual guarantee of Indian 
security.  This would enable Nehru to concentrate on developing India’s economy and 
industrial capabilities which could afford greater military capabilities in the future.  
Given that India was able to defend its maritime interests during this era its strategy can 
be viewed as a successful one, but the continued pursuit of this strategy was considered 
fraught with danger and India therefore sought change.  
C. THE ERA OF MILITARY BUILDUP (1963-75)   
In the aftermath of its war with China (1962), India was more cognizant of its 
security vulnerabilities and security was given greater priority during this period.  This 
was very fortuitous as India’s security was tested twice during the period in 1965 and 
1971.  During this period Indian maritime strategy separated itself from British interests 
and became much more attuned to India’s own security requirements and strategic 
planning process.  These developments were further impacted in 1968 when the British 
withdrew east of the Suez.   
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1. Threats 
The ability of the Indian leadership to accurately and decisively assess the 
maritime threat to India was less complicated during this era.  Its leadership was not as 
hindered by the clash of interests with the British.  The replacement of British with Indian 
officers was complete by 1962.  Freedom of decision also brought the realization that the 
overall threat to Indian maritime interests was more significant than had been previously 
believed.   
The threat from Pakistan arose mainly because it was being propped up by 
American and Chinese support.  With their aid Pakistan pursued a naval buildup in the 
early 1960’s.  Pakistan made it clear that it would use this advantage in its affairs with 
India.  Pakistan claimed the Rann of Kutch for its own in January 1965 and backed its 
claim with a naval offensive in April.30  Its submarine force bottled up the West Indian 
fleet in its homeport of Bombay in the 1965 war.31  The Indian leadership decided to not 
confront the Pakistani navy in this conflict in an effort to both prevent the expansion of 
the Kashmir war and the destruction of its navy which was derelict and in disrepair at the 
time.  While the Indian leadership had properly assessed that the Pakistani navy did not 
possess the capability to inflict harm upon the Indian center, it failed to account for public 
perception.  This failure by the navy to protect its shores would lead the populace to 
demand a more competent naval force.  By 1971 India had rectified its problems and the 
opportunity to restore the confidence of the nation presented itself.  This war versus 
Pakistan revealed that India was the clear maritime power among the South Asian 
countries.32   
The Indian leadership also properly assessed the threat from external powers upon 
the IOR as being more significant during this period.  With the British looking to remove 
themselves from the IOR in 1968, India hoped to assume leadership in their wake.  But 
the external powers had alternative plans with the Soviet Union and United States making 
efforts to fill the void.  In 1968 the Soviet Union conducted their first naval deployment 
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to the Indian Ocean.  In 1971 the United States began establishing a forward base at 
Diego Garcia and intervened in the 1971 war with the USS ENTERPRISE task force.  
This not only limited Indian freedom of action but also threatened Indian naval 
dominance in the region.  In order to preserve its freedom of action it pursued a plan to 
establish the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and signed a defense treaty with the Soviet 
Union in 1971.  The signing of the defense treaty with the Soviet Union placed India in 
the Soviet corner and thereby limited its options for future defense acquisitions from the 
West.   
2.  Interests  
Given the high threat environment that India faced during the period, Indian 
leadership chose to give greater priority to military buildup to rectify its increasingly 
hostile security problems.  It was during this period that the Indian navy received its 
greatest allocation from the Defense Budget.33  Indian leadership, intent on obtaining a 
submarine fleet, sent a delegation to the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union in 
1964. 34  The United States and Britain were unwilling to fulfill India’s requirements but 
the Soviet Union proved willing and able to fulfill India’s requests.  India’s continued 
attempts to balance its relations with both superpowers would serve to complicate its 
ability to satisfy its defense needs.  The 1967 Arab-Israeli war highlighted the capabilities 
of a potent missile boat force and thus it set out to create one.35  The 1965 war with 
Pakistan underscored the need for improved anti-submarine warfare capabilities and 
increased readiness among its naval force.  With a more united vision of naval force 
structure, Indian leadership set out to create the most formidable naval force in South 
Asia.  
3.  Capabilities  
The Indian navy began this period as a formidable force on paper, but in reality 
many of its ships were in great disrepair.  In 1962 its naval force included one light 
carrier, but only half its complement of aircraft; two cruisers, which were both 
undergoing extensive repairs; six destroyers, of which only one was operational; two old 
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frigates and eight newer frigates, of which three had severe operational limitations; six 
minesweepers; three seaward defense craft; one small tanker; and one maintenance and 
repair ship.36   By 1975 the Indian navy consisted of a missile boat force, a submarine 
force, an aircraft carrier task force and a naval air wing which included an anti-submarine 
component.  It had the makings of a modern naval fleet in all dimensions especially in 
contrast with the other maritime forces of South Asia. 
4.  Maritime Strategy  
With a clear expansion of threats, interests and capabilities during the period, 
India’s maritime strategy also changed.  For the first time India considered the Indian 
Ocean as its own, which embodied an expansion of maritime interests.  India also found 
itself in a higher threat environment from both China and Pakistan.  Due to the previous 
neglect to capabilities, India decided it needed to prepare for conflict and pursued a 
threat-based strategy.37  The end result was that India quickly turned its navy’s 
embarrassing performance in the 1965 war into a success.  India now claimed dominance 
in the Indian Ocean.  The removal of the British east of the Suez in 1968 and the Indian 
navy’s dominant performance in the 1971 war contributed to this belief.  By the early 
1970’s, India was committed to retaining its maritime dominance of the IOR.  While 
Indian leaders could agree that an expansive strategy was required the actual nature of 
India’s maritime strategy remained contentious though.  Some advocated a “sea denial” 
strategy which concentrated on denying access to the superpowers.  Others favored the 
development of a blue-water strategy that stressed sea control.  In the end, India decided 
that a blue-water strategy was less alarming to both the United States and China and 
would also enable them to continue the expansion of their maritime interests and 
capabilities without forcing either power to directly contain India.   
D. THE ERA OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION (1976-90) 
While India had emphasized solutions to its external security problems in the 
previous period, it had neglected its internal security problems.  Due to the uneven 
growth and prosperity of the country, many of its different ethnic and religious groups 
became unruly.  Emergency rule was declared in June 1975 in response to the social 
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unrest.  In the aftermath of this event, India set about to redistribute wealth and promote 
multilateral development which of course meant less for its defense needs.38  India’s 
defense efforts were also complicated by the 1973 oil crisis, the 1986 monsoon failure 
and the beginning of the Soviet Union’s economic restructuring which had significant 
effects on its defense industries and required India to pay more exorbitant prices to satisfy 
its defense needs.39   
1. Threats 
The overall threat to Indian maritime security in this period was increased as 
result of the expansion of the area of its strategic interests.  The primary threat to Indian 
interests was now extended to the security and stability of the Indian Ocean region.   
India was therefore forced to intervene in Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the late 1980’s.   
In addition, the traditional threat remained from Pakistan which utilized the Chinese and 
United States willingness to contain India’s power in an attempt to regain conventional 
parity with the Indian navy.  But while Pakistan’s navy increased its capabilities, it did 
not have the overall ability to keep pace with India’s naval expansion and was largely left 
behind.  It remained a thorn in India’s side, but one that it was willing to persist due to 
the likelihood of superpower intervention.  
The threat from external powers was much reduced in relation to the previous 
period but still present as the United States and Soviet Union continued their attempts to 
vie for control of the region in the larger context of the Cold War.40  As neither made any 
significant attempts to remove India from the dominant position, the status quo was 
largely maintained.  The Iran-Iraq and the US-Iraq Gulf Wars added an additional 
concern for the Indians as the United States sought to secure its access to the oil-
producing Middle East.  In the end, India and the United States saw their interests were 
mutual: maintaining access to Middle Eastern oil and ensuring its safe passage over the 
strategic sea lanes.  India also became more aware of the rising China in this period.  Its 
rapidly expanding economic and military power as well as its sphere of influence slowly 
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moved towards South Asia and began to encroach upon the IOR.  This directly threatened 
India’s rise and required a long-term plan to ensure India’s objectives could be achieved.    
2. Interests 
In the aftermath of British withdrawal east of the Suez, India underwent an 
expansion of interests and responsibilities when it assumed responsibility for the security 
and stability of the Indian Ocean region.  In addition, the 1974 discovery of petroleum 
fields off the west coast and the United Nation’s codification of the Law of the Sea in 
1982, further expanded India’s immediate maritime security concerns.  In total, this 
created an expansion of Indian interests that would require further expansion of Indian 
naval capabilities.  
3. Capabilities 
While India moved away from defense as it first priority and resumed 
emphasizing the buildup of its economy, it did not abandon the expansion of its 
capabilities.  During this period the Defense budget normalized to around 3-4 percent of 
GDP, of which, the Indian navy received between 8-13 percent of those funds.41  Despite 
their funding problems during this period, they acquired a multitude of capabilities: 
increasing the number of surface fleet vessels, further expanding its carrier force and 
submarine arm, and even acquiring a long range maritime air capability.  It accomplished 
this through an extensive array of acquisitions: from the British it acquired another 
aircraft carrier and its complement of aircraft as well as antisubmarine helicopters; from 
the Soviet Union it acquired numerous destroyers, missile boats, patrol vessels, 
minesweepers, eight KILO submarines, anti-submarine helicopters and maritime patrol 
aircraft; from Poland it acquired a few amphibious vessels; from Germany it acquired 
four TYPE 209 submarines and a fleet tanker; and from Korea it acquired six large patrol 
vessels.42  The most significant addition occurred late in this period and was short-lived, 
but was of considerable concern to most Western navies.  It was the lease of a nuclear 
powered submarine from the Soviet Union which arrived in 1988 and was returned in 
1991.43  In addition they were able to finally begin domestic production of warships: 
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producing four LEANDER frigates, three GODAVARI frigates, four KHUKRI missile 
boats, and one MAGAR landing ship.44  As the period concluded, India would find that 
its ability to both afford and acquire its defense needs would be put in peril by the fall of 
its leading defense partner, the Soviet Union.  Despite these setbacks, their efforts 
increased the overall capabilities of their naval force immensely and laid the foundation 
for the growth of a domestic defense industry that could supply them with the resource 
needs of the future.   
4. Maritime Strategy 
The Indian maritime strategy continued to expand during this period and turned 
toward a bottom-up strategy.45   A further opportunity to develop its maritime strategy 
was presented in 1982 with the change in international law by the UN Convention for the 
Law of Sea, which provided a newly demarcated Economic Exclusion Zone, and thereby 
enabled the Indian navy to expand its reach for the protection of India’s offshore 
resources.  As India took stock of this development it recognized that in addition to the 
expanded interests also revealed an additional category of threats which required a 
change in its force structure and forcing it to continue its pursuit of a blue water navy 
with extended reach into the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean.  For the first time the 
Indian Ocean could truly be an ‘Indian Lake” just as Nehru and others had prophesied.  
The ‘Rajiv Doctrine’ furthered this belief, but also revealed the duality of India’s 
strategy.  It executed its maritime security policy with a greater confidence, but it also 
remained committed to the Cold War framework and thereby consulted with the 
superpowers before committing to action.46  In total, India grew to be accepted as the 
regional dominant power, but its actions and policies drew resentment from its South 
Asian neighbors and would require further development of its maritime strategy.47   
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E. THE ERA OF POLITICAL ASCENDANCY (1990-2001) 
Only after the end of the Cold War did India, for the first time, begin to be 
considered as an economic and military power and emerged as the world’s fourth great 
power.48  In order to further progress its political objectives and to respond to increasing 
aggression, Indian leadership made the decision to demonstrate its nuclear weapons 
capability during this period.  Pakistan soon responded with its own demonstration and 
this had a convincing effect on the United States view of South Asia as a region of 
increasing importance.49  Indian maritime strategy during this period became more 
expansive largely due to this increased perception of its enhanced international status and 
the increased responsibilities that came with it.  India remained committed to liberalizing 
its economy and simultaneously sought to address the regional concerns of its military 
ambition.  In order to present India and its military power in a friendlier context, India 
began to demonstrate the soft power of its military as well.  The end of the Cold War 
presented two immediate problems for India: a change in the international balance of 
power, which created a more unipolar world; and the replacement of one of India’s 
critical trading partners, the USSR, by a much diminished Russia.  Both of these 
problems forced India to consider its strategic options.  India began to “chart a new 
course” which included increased indigenous defense production capability and 
diversification of its trading partners to maintain the supply of necessary defense 
acquisitions.50   
1. Threats 
The threat to Indian maritime interests expanded during this period as a result of a 
resurgent state-sponsored threat and the emergence of the threat from non-state actors, 
but was not significant enough to cause concern among Indian leadership and thereby 
force them to commit more funds to the Indian navy.  Indian leadership remained 
committed to building its domestic economy.  The threat from Pakistan remained critical 
despite India’s nuclear demonstration in 1998.  Pakistan demonstrated its willingness to 
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continue its rivalry with India with renewed aggression in the 1999 Kargil war and the 
Indian navy prepared to ensure it would be prepared for a war with Pakistan.  The 
development of the Pakistani navy did not represent a significant improvement during 
period.  Its force structure remained largely the same as it acquired three maritime patrol 
aircraft51 from the United States in 1996 and one advanced submarine52 from France in 
1999: but this did not present an immediate threat as it would take time to become 
operational.  The threat from China remained a major concern.  China’s navy had been 
rapidly expanding its capabilities since the early 1970’s, and this also coincided with a 
perceived expansion of its interests in the IOR.  By 1987 it was the third largest navy in 
the world and was increasingly viewed as a power-projection navy.53  India’s diplomatic 
efforts made this confrontation less likely, but the Indian navy planned for the 
contingency nonetheless.  A third potential threat to Indian interests gained popularity in 
this period and drove naval expansion was the idea of a united Muslim naval threat from 
Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan.54  The other maritime nations of the IOR did not represent a 
significant threat to India or its navy either, but undue influence by Chinese expansion 
represented a direct threat to India’s sphere of influence.  The Indian navy’s mission 
during this period was expanded to control Chinese influence in the IOR.  
The overall threat from non-state actors did increase during this period but its 
manifestation in the maritime domain was less recognizable to Indian leaders.  The threat 
originated from a variety of transnational and subnational groups that were responsible 
for much of the social unrest in South Asia.55  These groups were made more effective by 
the proliferation of small arms that they receive via the sea lanes from Southeast Asia 
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through the Bay of Bengal and from the Middle East through the Arabian Sea.56  Some 
believed that maritime violence was growing in the Indian Ocean, primarily due to the 
continued presence of piracy and the entry of terrorists.57  What was certain was that the 
Indian navy would need to respond to this threat in the near future.    
2. Interests 
In the aftermath of its assertion of regional power in the previous period, India 
sought to improve its image and demonstrate its ability to exercise ‘soft power.’  India’s 
interests in this period remained committed to its security and economic interests, but 
also expanded into the political dimension.  India sought to improve its relations with its 
neighbors to the southeast.  Its ‘Look East’ Policy also brought a diplomatic mission for 
its navy.  This period marked an increase in naval visits to countries of Southeast Asia 
would create good foundation for the years to come as India tackled the many problems 
of sustaining security and stability.  One of those issues was smuggling. Whether it be 
narcotics or small arms, India sought to curb its movement through the Indian Ocean 
because its threat to Indian security.58   
3. Capabilities 
With the economic and political demise of its leading defense partner, India 
considered new sources for the acquisition and production of its defense needs.  In 
addition, while its economy continued to grow and its military received a generous 
allotment, its navy did not benefit significantly through acquisition or production.  This 
era is largely considered a period of “neglect and downsizing” for the Indian navy.59   
The navy’s warships largely represented 1950’s and 1960’s era makeup, with the number 
of principal combatants shrinking during this period.   Its first aircraft carrier, INS 
Vikrant, decommissioned in 1997 and the second one, INS Viraat, is plagued by age and 
persistent breakdown, thus its longevity was questionable.  Therefore the navy sought a 
replacement in 1997, which began the plan to acquire the Russian carrier, Gorshkov, and                                                  
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also coincided with an announcement by the Defense Minister to pursue indigenous 
production of a carrier.60  But this capability was far in the future and represented the 
path that India was pursuing at this time, which was towards self reliance.  
4. Maritime Strategy 
Indian leadership in this period became satisfied with its navy’s composition in 
this period and thereby stressed a core competency strategy.61  This is largely due to the 
perceived decrease of threat in the maritime domain from both state and non-state actors. 
So Indian leadership believed that while the threat to Indian interests from Pakistan and 
non-state actors increased, its manifestation in the maritime dimension did not warrant 
increased expenditure. One significant addition to India’s maritime strategy was its role 
as a diplomatic tool.   This added dimension served to bolster relations with its Southeast 
Asian neighbors and thereby increase the perception of rising India.  
F.  CONCLUSION 
India’s maritime strategy began as a fiscal-based strategy in the era of economic 
reconstruction, evolved into a threat-based strategy in the era of military buildup, further 
evolved into bottom up strategy in the era of economic liberalization and finally became a 
strategy of core competency in the era of political ascendancy. The evolution and 
expansion of Indian maritime strategy has enabled the Indian navy to become the fifth 
largest navy in the world and the most powerful navy in South Asia.  At first design, it 
only enabled India to respond to a meager set of interests, threats due to its limited 
capabilities.  By 2001 India’s maritime strategy enabled it to respond to far reaching 
interests from the Red Sea to the Strait of Malacca, threats from a variety of state and 
non-state actors and was capable of responding to those threats with a more fully 
developed set of naval capabilities.  Its maritime strategy had grown more ambitious, not 
only in its ability to promote security, but also in its ability to serve its economic and 
political interests as well.  In total, India has developed and maintained a powerful navy, 
but its future strategy is uncertain given the present circumstances.  It is faced with a 
different set of threats ranging from an increasingly hostile Pakistan, an uncertain threat 
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from a rising China, as well as the responsibility of maintaining security and stability in 
one of the most undeveloped regions of the world.  Indian political and economic 
interests continue to expand, and this will undoubtedly require it’s military to keep pace 
the future.  National security in its maritime dimension requires a naval force that must 
continually be developed and maintained to provide it with the necessary capabilities to 
safeguard and promote an increasingly diverse array of economic and political interests.  
Without a proper analysis of the amalgamation of these factors, India’s maritime strategy 
in the near future will remain ambiguous which will hamper the development of effective 
responses to threats by the Indian navy, as well as the maintenance of the security and 
stability of the region generally.  
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III. LOCATING INDIA’S STRATEGIC POSITION 
It is necessary to begin by establishing India’s strategic position in order to 
establish where India fits into the picture at the global, regional and sub-regional levels.  
India has recently emerged into the international limelight largely due to its economic 
growth.  Since independence it has sought to play a leading role in world affairs and only 
recently has begun to show the competence to achieve its aspirations on a global, regional 
and sub-regional level.  
India is currently a ‘contender for major-power status’ in economic, political and 
military terms.62  India has the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of 
purchasing power parity, showed an average GDP growth rate of 6.5% between 1991-
2000 and appears to be making the necessary reforms to continue this growth for some 
time.  One analysis projects India will continue to exhibit a 6 percent growth rate through 
2020.63  India’s political maturation has also been noticed by some scholars.64  India is 
now a consensus candidate for permanent membership on the United Nations Security 
Council, should that institution ever reform, as some have envisioned.  India also 
possesses the third largest standing army and the fifth largest navy in the world.  It has 
achieved this standing with relatively small burden on its economy, maintaining a 
relatively stable 2-3 percent of its GDP.  In 2006 the defense budget is projected to 
eclipse $20 billion and with India’s current thirst for defense equipment, it will certainly 
grow.65   
India views itself as a partner in peace and prosperity with its Asian neighbors.  
As exhibited after the tsunami disaster in December 2004, India seeks to play a leading 
role in the security and stability of Asia, but wishes to share this leadership role with 
other Asian powers.  India views its relations with key Asian leaders such as China and 
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Japan as a precursor to establishing more influence in the region and has sought to create 
a more cooperative approach to security and stability in Asia.  India adopted a Look-East 
policy in 1994 as part of an effort to increase its relations with its Indo-Asian neighbors.  
India has recently extended its coverage in its policy to include its Pacific neighbors as 
well.66  India has also sought a greater role in regional security forums such as the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a means to increase its role in 
Asian affairs.   
As the largest, most populous and strongest economic and military power in the 
sub-continent India views itself as an arbiter of disputes in South Asia.  Stability in the 
rest of South Asia remains a chief concern.  Many of the surrounding countries continue 
to have internal security problems fomented by Islamist and Marxist movements.  While 
India would prefer the whole of South Asia emerge as flourishing democracies, it 
understands through experience that it must continue engagement with the controlling 
regimes of each nation in South Asia.67  Through this pragmatic approach, India hopes 
that all of South Asia will reap the benefits of India’s global rise and South Asia will 
emerge as a more stable and secure region. 
India’s approach at each level may differ, but it is its firm belief that it should 
play a leading role in the security and stability of the global community that should be 
remembered.  The tools of diplomacy for India include its perceived political, economic 
and military power.  India has become a political and economic force to be reckoned with 
at all levels in recent times.  As the military capabilities of India increase, India is likely 
to utilize this tool at the regional and global level as well.  It is in this context that India’s 
rise could be a threat to security and stability and must be viewed with skepticism by 
other key regional players.  
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IV. UNLOCKING INDIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
India’s propensity to use its defense forces to secure its national interests has 
never wavered.  The Indian navy, like all others, exists to support the nation’s strategic 
interests.68  For India, those interests are defined as its security, economic and political 
interests, which its government and military view as interrelated and cyclical in nature.69  
Greater security provides fertile soil for economic growth and political ascendancy, 
economic growth provides for increased security and political ascendancy, and political 
ascendancy opens doors to enable greater security and economic benefits.  In the course 
of examining each of India’s interests, I will analyze its objectives, challenges and 
strategies to safeguard those interests.  Finally, I will conclude each section by 
highlighting the progress of the Indian navy in achieving each of these objectives.   
B.  CATEGORIES OF NATIONAL INTERESTS 
National interests can be organized into four categories: survival, vital, major, or 
peripheral.70  Particular interests may change categories given different circumstances, 
with the exception of survival interests, whose preeminence is obvious.  As the 
circumstances change, a vital interest may become only peripheral.  For instance, in its 
1965 war with Pakistan, the Pakistan navy’s overall capabilities were not significant 
enough to threaten the survival of the Indian regime71 and so India chose to preserve its 
limited naval capabilities by concentrating its naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.  As a 
result, Pakistan was able to attack the coastline at will, but as the Indians had predicted,  
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was incapable of gaining a strategic advantage.  This scenario is not as likely to occur 
today given the increase in Pakistan’s naval capabilities and India’s dependence upon its 
sea lanes to sustain its economy.   
Survival interests are, self evidently, those that are critical to the existence of the 
government or nation-state.  Threats to a nation’s survival are often regarded by the 
leadership as synonymous with threats to national existence, and tend to lead to the same 
options: though they may all require concessions by those wishing to remain in power.   
Vital interests are those that could result in serious harm to the security and well-
being of the nation.  They include its territory and vital infrastructure, the safety of its 
citizens at home and abroad, and the economic well-being of its society.72  India’s current 
vital interests include its land borders, and its sea and air space, the credibility of its 
nuclear deterrent, and its economy which is highly dependent upon its energy security.  
India’s dependence on external energy sources and the vulnerability of its supply routes 
make this an increasingly vulnerable vital interest.73  Threats to these interests pose 
potential rather than imminent dangers and therefore allow leadership to pursue 
diplomacy before violence to safeguard them.   
Major interests are those that have significant, but nevertheless limited potential 
for serious harm.  They include preventing external conflicts within the region, such as 
the Afghan conflict and Sri Lankan civil war, safeguarding its immediate Economic 
Exclusion Zone (EEZ); and preventing “inimical external powers” from armed 
intervention, establishing military bases and undermining the Indian Ocean as a zone of 
peace.74  Threats to these interests require a concerted effort to resolve, but are negotiable 
and, therefore, provide for greater flexibility in resolving disputes.   
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Finally, peripheral interests are those that are unlikely to require immediate action 
and, therefore, are accorded a wait and see approach.  They include the well-being of the 
Indian diaspora and promotion of secular values and human rights.  Threats to such 
interests do not routinely lead to conflict.  
C. INDIA’S SECURITY INTERESTS  
As in most countries, India’s security interests are reflective of its historical 
memory.  The partitioning of South Asia was a violent affair whose effects are still 
apparent in the residual instability of the sub-continent.  Since that time, South Asia has 
been a conflict-prone region with a widespread epidemic of intra-state armed conflicts.  
Therefore, India’s primary security objective is to establish a confrontation-free external 
environment, while realistically preparing for potential conflicts of the future.75   
There are numerous challenges which impinge upon India’s achievement of its 
security interests.  South Asia is plagued by intra-state armed conflicts, fundamentalist 
activism, terrorism, and political instability; all of which serve to threaten security and 
stability of India and the IOR.  In addition, India has yet to resolve its own borders and 
this remains a critical concern of its leadership.76  Within India’s short history, it has 
fought four wars with Pakistan and China over border, ethnic and religious issues.  In 
addition, there have been numerous conflicts and crises which can be attributed to the 
ethnic, religious and linguistic divides in the region.  In total, there remains an “enduring 
rivalry” and “protracted contest” which is not constructive to the security and stability of 
the region.77 
India’s response to its security challenges is twofold: on the one hand it is 
increasing its cooperation with its regional and global partners to create a more stable and 
secure environment, while it has also chosen to prepare its military for potential conflict.  
According to Defence Minister Mukherjee, “India’s desire for peace and the use of 
diplomatic means for the resolution of all conflicts is unwavering.  However, as a large 
and vibrant democracy with a diverse social religious and economic background of its 
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peoples, the country finds that its peaceful stance must be backed by a credible military 
deterrent.”78  In addition, India’s 2004 Defense report suggests that “this is sought to be 
achieved through a combination of defense preparedness, unilateral restraint, confidence-
building dialogue, and expanding bilateral and multilateral interaction.”79    
 
  
Figure 1.   Indian Navy’s Area of Interest. 
 
The Indian navy is the world’s 5th largest navy and is pursuing an expansive 
development and acquisition program to meet the evolving regional and global threats 
and also its expanding political and economic interests.80  Its ability to support India’s 
national interests is expanding.  India has developed a formidable navy which exceeds the 
capabilities of its littoral neighbors, but is also attempting to take greater responsibility of 
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the entire IOR.  The Indian navy’s vision is to promote an “environment of peace and 
tranquility in the IOR to further India’s political, economic, diplomatic and military 
objectives.  [It] will deter war through strength, but if deterrence fails, [it] must strive to 
achieve victory over the adversary by [its] reach and firepower.”81   
The Indian navy’s efforts are chiefly devoted to better protecting India’s security 
interests from the surrounding states.    The Indian navy has also recently decided to 
augment its current strategic forces by developing a ballistic missile-equipped nuclear 
submarine.82  In total, this provides a credible military deterrent for most state actors.  
The Indian navy is also using its strengths as a tool for improving the security of the 
smaller countries of South Asia.  The Indian navy has worked extensively with Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh and Myanmar to improve its maritime security and thereby improve the 
overall security of the IOR.  
The Indian navy is also working to protect its security interests from non-state 
actors.  It is extending its reach into the Indian Ocean Region to counter piracy, which 
according to the International Maritime Bureau is most prominent in the Indian Ocean 
Region and Southeast Asia.83   Its efforts have resulted in a decreased amount of piracy in 
its immediate area, but will require further operational expansion to create a significant 
impact upon piracy in the entire IOR.84  Its expanded presence also serves to interdict the 
small arms’ proliferation which provides the weapons to many of the non-state actors, 
and thereby provides some utility in providing security to the interior.85   
The Indian navy has also worked hard with its regional and global partners to 
create a more stable and secure environment.  According to the Indian Chief of Naval 
Staff, Admiral Arun Prakash, “India sees her navy as a force for good: assuring peace, 
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tranquility and stability in the IOR and building bridges across the seas.”86  In the 
aftermath of 9/11, it patrolled the Strait of Malacca to ensure the safety and security of 
maritime shipping during that tense period.  It also worked with many regional neighbors 
to bring relief to the people that were devastated by the December 2004 tsunami.  In 
addition, it has hosted and been partner to numerous exercises with foreign military 
powers to enhance maritime security, bolster interoperability and improve relations.  
On the whole, a strong and engaged Indian navy has served to bolster the security 
of its area of interest from state actors as well as non-state actors. India and Pakistan 
remain engaged despite increased tensions as a result of the Mumbai bombings, which is 
important for the long-term peace process and India’ security interests.  In addition, India 
and China continue to work toward improving their relationship which can only enhance 
India’s security.  Finally, the smaller South Asian states remain stable and secure for the 
time-being.   
D. INDIA’S ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
At the time of its independence, India was an appallingly poor country, whose 
leadership nevertheless had no difficult imagining that it might one day become a “great 
power.”87  India pursued its independence through peaceful means and has sought to 
become a world power in the same manner.  Rather than climbing the “great power” 
ladder through military force, India sought to concentrate on its economic development.  
Nehru’s strategies failed to secure its economic success in the early years, but his 
successors have continued the struggle and have made great progress toward that goal.  
Since 1991, India has turned the corner and become one of the leading economies in the 
world, most recently exhibiting an economic growth of 8 percent between 2002 and 
2005.88  The importance India has placed upon this endeavor is obvious when examining 
its strategic objectives.89  Therefore, maintaining its economic growth is not only a 
primary economic interest, but a strategic one as well.  
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There are numerous challenges which impinge upon India’s achievement of its 
economic interests.  Before the early 1990’s, the international climate did not support 
India’s economic growth due South Asia’s relative lack of importance to either the 
United States or the Soviet Union.90  A significant challenge today is the growth and 
maintenance of a climate that supports India’s economic growth.  To accomplish this, 
India will be forced to pursue a more influential role in regional and global forums.   
Another significant challenge is the need to maintain security and stability which 
will enable growth, and encourage investment and trade.91  India’s inability to resolve its 
security issues with Pakistan is one of the chief reasons it has been unable to take 
advantage of its geographic location to improve its economic performance.  A solution 
with Pakistan would enable India to make land connections with the Middle East and 
Central Asia, which currently houses the largest energy supplies in the world.  This 
brings us to another significant challenge to India’s economic interests.  India is an 
energy deficient country and this has forced the government to pursue more expansive 
energy security policies in order to maintain economic growth.92  PM Singh stated that 
India’s future energy needs by 2030 would be 4 to 5 times higher if its economy was 
required to maintain its current growth levels.93   He further underscored the “vital” 
importance of increased supplies and access to energy in order to maintain India’s current 
growth level.  Additional challenges that have been cited include an undersized local 
industrial infrastructure, the lack of a robust level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
China’s simultaneous rise, which competes with India in the same markets, and India’s 
own internal reforms in agriculture, industry and services.94  While India has never gone 
to war over its economic interests, the pressure to keep its economy rising will inevitably 
present Indian leadership with some challenging decisions in the future.  
India’s response to its economic challenges is twofold: it has initiated a 
cooperative approach in concert with its “Look East” policy to engage with the East 
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Asian Tiger economies and utilize their momentum and experience to propel India’s 
growth, while also emphasizing increased efficiency to encourage the development of 
more sound practices and reduce waste.  This strategy has been incorporated into many of 
India’s policy documents.  PM Singh noted in his Red Fort Speech that there has been a 
significant expansion of economic links with the United States, China, Japan, European 
Union, Russia, Southeast Asia, the Gulf and Arab world, as well as the continents of 
Africa and Latin America in order to further its interests and pursue a secure and stable 
environment that will enable efficient growth.95  In addition, India has pursued more 
cost-effective and long-term alternatives to meet its energy requirements, to include the 
U.S.-India Nuclear deal which is a critical requirement for the maintenance of its 
economic growth.96  India is also undergoing a reform process to liberalize portions of its 
industrial sector and thereby enable economic growth to be more sustainable.97  
The Indian navy’s ability to support India’s economic interests is expanding as 
well.  As mentioned before, Indian leadership views its security and economic interests as 
enablers of each other.  Therefore, the Indian navy has initiated efforts to better secure 
India’s vital lines of communication which will bolster the confidence in its economic 
security and encourage greater FDI.  In addition, the Indian navy has sought to improve 
its neighbor’s ability to support maritime security efforts by transferring some of its aging 
platforms to its littoral neighbors.98  Sri Lanka and Maldives have both been the recipient 
of Indian naval platforms.  It has also recently set about to acquire more maritime patrol 
aircraft in order to expand its reach into the Indian Ocean and, thereby, provide for a 
more secure environment for shipping in the heavily pirated waters of the IOR.99 
The Indian navy is also supporting India’s economic interests by becoming more 
self-sufficient.  While this is not something that is providing immediate payoff, the long                                                  
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term payoff is potentially immense.  As India’s shipbuilding industry gains more 
experience and capability, it will become less dependent upon expensive foreign military 
sales such as the Russian Carrier Gorshkov, which cost an exorbitant 1.5 billion U.S. 
dollars.100  In addition, the expansion and maturation of the shipbuilding and arms 
industry will further India’s economic interests by providing opportunities for future arms 
sales and would undoubtedly contribute to India’s economic growth potential. 
On the whole, the Indian navy has furthered India’s economic interests by 
ensuring a more secure environment to encourage economic growth and implementing 
plans to become more self-sufficient.  India remains poised to continue its strong 
economic growth, exhibiting an estimated growth of 8.1 percent in 2005-06.101  In 
addition, India’s willingness to support its neighbor’s security and economic growth will 
ultimately contribute to its own long-term economic interests.  India’s improved 
economic policies and planning will enable it to become less reactionary and thereby 
provide greater economic security in the long run.   
E. INDIA’S POLITICAL INTERESTS 
India’s political interests are reflective of its historical identification as “one of the 
world’s largest and most enduring civilizations,” a certain belief in its “existing 
geopolitical status (sub-continental size and large population),” and the perception of its 
“potential economic and military power.”102  India’s pursuit of this international role was 
an uncertain one in its early years, but has become more visible in recent times.  India, in 
the wake of independence, did not exhibit a mature and confident foreign policy, possess 
a robust economy, or have sufficient military capabilities to safeguard its interests and 
therefore seemed unable to climb the ladder of “great power” status.  Before 1990, India 
was viewed as a “permanent protester in the international system.”103  Its stasis was 
finally ended following reforms by Rajiv Gandhi and more open relations with the West, 
which made it more amenable to the international system that survived and dominated in 
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the post-Cold War era.104  The India of today possesses a more mature and confident 
foreign policy which is evident in its increased status as a member or observer in the 
many regional and global forums it has joined since 1990.  It has also improved its 
economic status becoming the fifth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing 
power parity.  Finally, it has developed and maintained a robust and diversified military 
capability that can better safeguard its national interests.  These are the critical 
components which have enabled India to rise in political stature, and can contribute to its 
inclusion among the world’s political leaders.  The attainment of this goal remains India’s 
primary political objective.105 
There are numerous challenges which impinge upon India’s achievement of its 
political interests.  No issue has dominated India’s foreign policy since independence 
than that of Pakistan and the Kashmir issue.  These countries have fought three wars and 
two lower intensity conflicts over the span of 60 years.  This political issue has become 
so divisive that it has forced external powers to become polarized on the issue, supporting 
either India or Pakistan.  Pakistan’s continued proxy war to wrest control of the Kashmir 
region from India is one of the most significant challenges to India’s political interests, 
and represents a major constraint to India’s continued rise.106  This challenge was further 
complicated in 1998 when both countries announced their nuclear capability.  Thereafter, 
the international community has taken a greater interest in India-Pakistan relations in 
order to forestall an escalatory nuclear conflict.   
Another issue that impinges on India’s political interests is China’s concurrent 
rise in East Asia.  Both countries have large populations, robust economies and 
formidable military forces, with overlapping areas of political and economic influence.  
This has led to a “protracted contest.”107  Finally, India is challenged by the unipolar 
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system which dominates the world today and seeks to replace it with a multi-polar system 
that would provide greater benefit to its political interests as well as many others.  India’s 
involvement in the 1971 war was initiated to further its political interests, and will likely 
resort to violent means in the future if the circumstances are required, especially given its 
perception of the interrelationship between its security, economic and political interests.  
India’s strategy to achieve its political interests is two-fold: It has chosen to 
increase its role in regional and global forums in order to gain a wider voice in 
international affairs, and it has also sought reform in the United Nations.  India has cast a 
wide net in its efforts to increase its role in regional and global forums.  India has pursued 
closer relations with Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
Southeast Asian countries, becoming a member of the Regional forum in 1996.   India 
has continued its attempts to make the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) an important entity, but it has failed to gain the same significance as that of 
ASEAN.  India also became a member of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization in 2005 
in order to better access the resources of the Central Asian countries and improve its 
bargaining position vis-à-vis China.  India’s ability to initiate change in the international 
system by directly challenging the United States is limited.  As such, it has pursued its 
interests by seeking to change the international system indirectly.  India seeks reform of 
the UN and its Security Council in order to give it greater relevance in the current 
international system.  The United States has traditionally sought to pursue its interests, 
and utilized the UN as a source to legitimize its efforts, given the almost guaranteed 
Soviet opposition during the Cold War.  Since the end of the Cold War, the United States 
has found it less necessary to legitimize its pursuit to the UN and pursued its interests 
unilaterally. This has served to undermine the power of the United Nations and its 
Security Council.  As part of the Group of Four (G4), India seeks reform of the Security 
Council in order to “enhance the UN’s capacity to meet the challenges of the future” and 
will coincidentally further its political interests.108  
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The Indian navy’s ability to support India’s political interests has been based upon 
a two-pronged strategy: to build strong relations through overseas deployments, and 
maritime exercises and training with our immediate neighbors in the IOR and countries 
of strategic interest, as well as taking part in humanitarian service missions to 
demonstrate India’s compassion and provide aid to those in need.  As part of its effort to 
build stronger relations, the Indian navy has initiated exercises with many countries of 
strategic significance.  In 2003, the Indian navy conducted exercises with the United 
States navy, Russian navy, French Navy, Chinese (PLA) navy, Indonesian navy, the 
Royal navy of Oman, and many of the littoral navies of the IOR.  It also conducted a 
series of overseas deployments to over 45 nations to “build bridges of friendship” across 
the oceans.109  On January 23, 2003, the INS Tarangini began a 34,923 nautical mile 
voyage to circumnavigate the globe which concluded on 25 April, 2004.  In 2004, the 
Indian navy conducted exercises with the Republic of Singapore, the French navy, the 
British “Royal” navy, the Indonesian navy, and the United States navy.  It also conducted 
operations off Mozambique in support of the World Economic Forum Meeting, sent a 
team that successfully scaled Mount Everest, and a series of overseas deployments that 
included numerous port calls in a concerted effort to “present its culture and heritage 
whilst imbibing those of the visiting nation to showcase our vast technological and 
industrial advancements.”110  In 2005, the Indian navy conducted exercises with the 
Royal navy of Oman, Singapore navy, French navy, Russian navy, United States navy, 
Indonesian navy, and the Royal Thai navy.  It also conducted a series of overseas 
deployments to 30 countries in Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the South China 
Sea and the IOR and in recognition of “the criticality and centrality of foreign 
cooperation in the maritime sphere,” created the Directorate of Foreign Liaison to 
coordinate future events.111  
The Indian navy’s ability to support humanitarian service missions was 
significant, but has increased in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami.  In 2003,                                                  
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the Indian navy provided flood relief operations to the country of Sri Lanka and 
continuous support to maritime authorities for Search and Rescue (SAR).  In 2004, the 
Indian navy provided assistance to the Mumbai Port Trust during a flash strike to 
facilitate the movement of vessels in/out of harbor for a brief period of time. Also in the 
2004, the Indian navy conducted numerous SAR and diving operations to rescue and 
recover fishermen lost at sea and began a lengthy response to the December 26, 2004 
tsunami.  In 2005, the Indian navy continued its support to the tsunami relief operations 
deploying its ships and aircraft to the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.  This provided 
valuable lessons learned and highlighted the critical need for increased sea-lift 
capabilities within the Indian navy.  The Indian navy also provided flood relief to 
Mumbai and Andhra Pradesh and offered its assistance in response to Hurricane Katrina 
which devastated New Orleans and the United States’ Gulf coast.  
On the whole, the Indian navy’s confident, competent and visible maritime 
presence has served to build stronger relations and demonstrate an “abundance of 
empathy” to the many nations which it has come into contact.112  Its emphasis on 
international cooperation has significantly contributed to its overall political objectives 
through its training and exercises with foreign partners and providing much-needed relief 
in response to numerous natural disasters and crises.  This demonstration of the Indian 
navy’s professionalism, reach, and sheer competence is what the Indian navy is counting 
on to “win friends and influence people.”113   
F. CONCLUSIONS 
India’s national interests have certainly expanded in the current era.  India views 
its security, economic and political interests as co-determinant.  Therefore, it will become 
increasingly important for external powers to understand this view in order to prevent 
crossing one of India’s strategic tripwires.  India’s primary national interest is its 
continued political, economic and military ascendance to becoming a great power.  This  
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has been the goal since independence, and though it has wavered at times, India seems 
more capable now than ever of achieving this objective.  The Indian navy has been 
identified as one of the key enablers of this objective.   
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V. THREATS TO INDIA AND ITS NAVY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Strategies exist, above all, to counter threats.  A credible threat must have both 
intent and capability.  A threat is defined as challenge to the national interests of India 
within its perceived area of interest.  India’s maritime area of interest was recently 
defined by its Chief of Naval Staff recently when he said that “whatever happens in the 
IOR can impact crucially on our security and should be of interest to our maritime 
forces.”114  This area, better defined, extends from the east coast of Africa and the Persian 
Gulf region in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east.  Many of India’s threats are 
traditional, but there is a newly emerging dynamic non-traditional threat which is one that 
India must confront in order to secure its interests.  
The maritime domain presents significant security challenges for even the most 
capable of countries.  The United States possesses the most capable naval force of all 
time, and yet even it is incapable of meeting all the challenges that are presented in 
today’s maritime sphere.  For India, its area of interest is much smaller, but presents all of 
the same challenges in terms of threats. The United States National Strategy for Maritime 
Security defined these threats as traditional and non-traditional and this definition is 
equally useful in the Indian context.115  In this framework, traditional threats are those 
posed by other states.  Non-traditional threats are those that arise from transnational or 
criminal activity.  Traditional threats will be analyzed in the first section of this chapter.  
For India, these threats are most often reflected as concentric circles which begin on 
India’s center and extend toward the periphery of its area of interest.  In the second 
section the non-traditional threat will be analyzed.  For India, these threats have been 
defined as terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and, due to their frequency in South Asia, natural 
disasters.116  
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B. TRADITIONAL THREATS 
The traditional threats for India and its navy is often reflected as concentric circles 
which begin on India’s center and extend toward the periphery of its area of interest.117  
Threats that reside in the innermost circle are those that lie within the immediate vicinity 
of India’s maritime domain.  These include Pakistan and India’s smaller South Asian 
neighbors – Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.  Nepal and 
Bhutan are both landlocked and therefore are not as significant of a factor in the maritime 
equation.  Threats that reside in the middle circle are those that lie on the periphery of the 
IOR.  These include the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asian regions.   Threats that reside in 
the outermost circle are those of external powers that present a significant challenge to 
India because of their intervention in South Asian affairs.  China, which might be 
considered part of the inner circle by virtue of sharing a land border with India, is moved 
to the outermost circle in maritime terms because the two nations do not share a maritime 
boundary.  The United States must also be considered in this group.   
1.   Pakistan  
Pakistan is the only country in South Asia that directly challenges India’s 
dominance and, therefore, poses an immediate threat to Indian security.  Pakistan was 
severed from colonial India due to its belief that it could not survive while subordinated 
to Hindu rule and though Indian Muslims have prospered, the issue of Hindu hegemony 
over Muslims remains contentious.  The issue of Kashmir captures the significance of the 
conflict.  It is the most significant issue between these two nations, and one that has 
served to destabilize the entire region for many years.  This state’s importance to the 
national identity of both nations’ cannot be understated.  The fact that both countries 
went nuclear in 1998 has done little to resolve this issue.  Long term security and stability 
in South Asia will only be accomplished by resolving this critical issue, but neither side 
has been willing to alter its stance, so the competition continues.  The unity of Pakistani 
Muslims is based on this issue and so a solution to this problem is probably not in the 
interest of Pakistan, even if the solution is in its favor.  
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a.  Defining the Threat 
The threat from Pakistan comes in many forms: historical, ideological and 
political.  Historically, the conflict between the residents of these two nations has been 
evident for centuries.  The origins lie in the forced subjugation of the Hindus during the 
Mughal period.  The conflict continued even into the era of colonial rule by the British, in 
which they altered the makeup of society by elevating the Hindu position above that of 
their Muslim counterparts.  The conflict can also be attributed to the “cupidity of the 
British in their failed management of the partition.”118  While the conflict has historical 
roots in the previous periods, it is most accurately defined by the most recent 
manifestation which has persisted since independence in 1947.  In the aftermath of 
partition, the mass migration of the population of British India into a Muslim Pakistan 
and Hindu India resulted in the death of tens of millions.  The most recent conflict began 
with blood shed during that migration.  Lawrence Ziring accurately describes the graphic 
nature of this relationship when he said “The hateful venom that was released in the orgy 
of partition infected India-Pakistan relations from that time forward.  Each saw the other 
as a determined foe, and each was equally determined to defend itself from the other at 
any cost.”119   Since partition this conflict has resulted in three large-scale wars and many 
small-scale operations which have served to make this an “enduring and protracted 
conflict”.120   
The threat from Pakistan is also ideological, in that conflict exists between 
the two dominant religious groups in South Asia – Hindus and Muslims.  As mentioned 
previously, the conflict began centuries ago between these two groups and the conflict 
has persisted largely as a result of an unwillingness of either to be further subjugated.  
Stephen Philip Cohen suggests that India perceives Pakistan as representing a cultural 
threat because Hinduism has always been “the odd man out” with Islam and Christianity 
dominating the subcontinent since the seventh century of the Christian Calendar.121  
Dossani and Rowen’s examination of the conflict revealed that both countries possess 
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radical segments of its society and advocate for the destruction of the other.122  In 
Pakistan it began with Maulana Maududi’s Jamaat-i-Islami (Party of Islam) and was 
fanned by leaders such as Mohammad Zia al-Huq.  In India it was the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its affiliates which now is associated with the Bharatiya 
Janata Party.  In both countries these parties took a back seat to the politics of their 
founding fathers, Jinnah and Nehru, but both have found a way to persist and even rise to 
prominence at times.  The periods of their rise often coincide with periods of increased 
tension between India and Pakistan. 
The threat from Pakistan is also political.  With the departure of the 
British, a power vacuum was revealed.  And though India is immensely larger in size and 
population, it has been unable to convince the West and the developing world of its 
hegemony due to the persistent conflict with the smaller Pakistan.123  Some scholars 
believe that Pakistan intends to reduce India in size, by encouraging internal disorder of 
India’s diverse polity to further partition the subcontinent.124  The territorial 
reorganization would thereby enable the Hindu population to come under Muslim rule as 
it had during the Mughal period.  The Indian leadership, in recognition of Pakistan’s 
divisive attempts, has made it a point of emphasis and promises to do “whatever is 
required to deal with the challenge at hand.”125  
b. Threat to India and Its Navy 
According to a current study by Cordesman and Kleiber, the Pakistan navy 
is roughly one-half the size of India’s in terms of personnel and only one-fifth the size of 
India in terms of naval combat vessels.126  While Pakistan suffers from a quantitative 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the Indian navy, it has tried to emphasize the overall quality of its 
naval combat vessels as the decisive factor in a naval clash with India.  This qualitative 
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difference is being eroded by India’s recent acquisitions and is likely to result in India 
developing quantitative and qualitative advantage over the Pakistani navy.  This has 
mostly been possible through India’s sizeable defense budget in relation to Pakistan’s.   
The defense burden on India’s economy is relatively low, at 2-3 percent, while Pakistan’s 
is relatively high, at over 10 percent.127  So over the long term, India has proven more 
capable of absorbing the high costs of its enduring conflict with Pakistan, and seems 
likely to continue to do so.  
Pakistan’s naval fleet is a modest but effective coastal defense force.  Its 
surface fleet is comprised of mostly aging vessels acquired from the United Kingdom, 
France and China.  It consists of one Gearing class destroyer, eight Amazon and Leander 
class frigates, ten patrol craft and three mine warfare vessels.  Pakistan will need to 
commit to the acquisition of more vessels in order to maintain an effective deterrent.  Its 
submarine fleet represents the most potent offensive weapon of the Pakistani navy.  It 
consists of 11 submarines of French origin.  The Agosta-90 submarine is its newest and 
most potent submarine which it hopes to utilize as a nuclear strike platform in the future.  
When this is achieved it will provide a second-strike capability and thereby increase the 
credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent.   
The Pakistani navy also possesses a modest naval air arm.  It was 
developed in the aftermath of the 1971 war and represents another qualitative advantage 
that Pakistan hopes to utilize in a potential conflict with India.128   The force is composed 
of French Atlantic, F-27 FOKKER and P-3C land-based maritime aircraft which are 
operated by the Pakistani Air Force.  It recently acquired eight more P-3C in 2005 which 
will inevitably boost Pakistan’s surveillance capability.129    
Another significant factor that contributes to the Pakistani qualitative 
advantage over the Indian navy is the quality of operational and educational training that 
its naval officers receive.  In the past, the Pakistani navy did possess a decisive advantage 
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in that it was able to conduct operational training with the United States Navy, the most 
capable force in the world.  This provided Pakistan with superior training and operational 
experience, but since 2001, the Indian navy has also made this a point of emphasis in 
order to reduce the qualitative advantage that Pakistan held.   
The Pakistan navy possesses a distinct disadvantage in terms of geography 
and characteristics of its port facilities.  Its primary port at Karachi is very close to India’s 
bases along the Gujarat coast and possesses very shallow approaches and long channel 
that could be easily mined.  India used this to its advantage during the 1971 war with 
Pakistan by blockading Karachi.  Pakistan has since committed to constructing a deep sea 
port at Gwadar and an additional port at Ormara to provide greater strategic depth.  With 
two additional ports for its military and shipping to conduct operations out of, Pakistan is 
much less vulnerable to Indian attempts to blockade its military, but also in India’s ability 
to strangle the Pakistani economy.  
Since the 1971 war, the Pakistani navy has attempted to regain its 
credibility as an effective fighting force.  Given the Indian navy’s increasingly 
quantitative and qualitative advantage, it will require significant acquisitions to preserve 
its deterrent capability.  Given the Indian navy’s decisive advantages, the Pakistan navy 
is more dependent upon the element of surprise and this is a potentially destabilizing 
factor.  The acquisition and development of a second-strike capability on the Agosta-90 
submarine would enhance Pakistan’s strategic deterrent so long as they could avoid 
detection by the Indian navy.  In total, the Pakistan navy possesses a modest naval force 
which poses a moderate threat to the Indian navy.   
2. Neighboring Small States 
The security environment in South Asia is also complicated by the lack of 
effective governance by many of India’s smaller neighbors which has led to persistent 
internal instability.  The most significant challenges that India’s neighboring small states 
pose for it is in the continued internal instability.  It is feared that each could result in a 
failed state and this would unnecessarily draw extra-regional involvement. This 
increasingly requires an Indian response through the effective projection of force on short 
notice (as it did to prevent a coup in the Maldives in 1988) to maintain stability and 
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security along the Indian periphery.130  But India has become more reluctant to interfere 
in the internal affairs in the wake of its operations in Sri Lanka in 1988-90 which led to 
an embarrassing withdrawal.  Long term security from this threat rests on India’s ability 
to promote effective governance in its neighboring states, whether this comes through 
active military involvement or diplomatic pressure will be determined by India’s 
acceptance of the risks associated with each venture.  
a.  Defining the Threat 
In Bangladesh, the threat is mostly ideological in that Bangladesh was 
East Pakistan which sponsored the idea of a “two-nation” theory in its partition from 
India in 1947.131  This theory rested upon the notion that Muslims and Hindus could not 
live together peacefully.  While India has attempted to provide evidence that the theory is 
incorrect, it has been unable to convince most of its Muslim neighbors.  Even when India 
participated in Bangladesh’s efforts to gain independence from West Pakistan in 1971, 
little changed because the ruling elite in Bangladesh remained suspicious of Hindu 
domination.  Currently, the threat has been viewed as more political in that Bangladesh 
has since independence maintained good relations with China and its undue influence 
could harm India.132  K.M. Panikkar pointed out the significance of this region which 
was once utilized to transport equipment for a war, though it flowed eastward.133  India 
has retained this memory and fears Bangladesh could provide for a transit point in its 
invasion of the subcontinent.    
In Burma, the threat is political in that Burma has historically been under 
the influence of China, though in the immediate post-independence period it shared good 
relations with India as well.134  In the aftermath of India’s 1962 war with China, Burma 
saw no reason to jeopardize its standing with China in order to maintain its nominal ties 
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with India.  Then, in 1988 with the takeover of the country by a military regime, India 
had little interest in dealing with the new regime.   Both regimes have been incapable of 
providing security along its common border with India and this has been a significant 
area of concern for India.  Their lack of effective governance has contributed to an 
insurgency along its common border with India and has resulted in Indian military 
responses.  The current situation has changed somewhat.  The insurgency continues along 
India’s common border with Burma, but it has developed a more cooperative relationship 
in order to confront what India sees as a greater threat.135  India has seen that China’s 
influence in the region could jeopardize its security.  India fears Burma presents the entry 
route for a Chinese invasion of the subcontinent.  It is with this realization that India 
began its “Look East” policy, which led to an improvement in relations with Burma, no 
matter which regime held control.  It is therefore committed to balancing Chinese 
political influence in Burma.  
In Sri Lanka, the threat is more complex than the other small states.  The 
threat is political insofar as Sri Lanka seeks a multi-polar South Asia, where it plays a 
more integral role.136  At one time or another it has turned to different extra-regional 
partners to aid with its insurgency.  India has sought to prevent outside interference and 
has made efforts to contribute to the Sinhalese efforts to regain control of its insurgency 
problem.  India’s aid is not so robust as to enable resolution of the issue because it also 
fears Sri Lanka for other reasons.  The threat is also economic in that Sri Lanka poses a 
significant challenge to India’s ability to dominate the Indian Ocean trade routes which 
contribute significantly to its economy.137  Sri Lanka’s location and magnificent harbor 
facilities make it a significant threat to India’s maritime trade industry.138  The threat is 
also ideological in that Sri Lanka is home to a Tamil population which seeks to create an 
autonomous Tamil state in north Sri Lanka, and this directly threatens the unity of India, 
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which has its own Tamil population in southern India.139  These two Tamil populations 
are separated only by the small bay that separates India and the northern part of Sri 
Lanka.  India fears that the creation of an autonomous Tamil state in Sri Lanka might 
embolden its resident population to seek greater autonomy.   The Tamil threat also 
represents a military threat, since the Tamils have in the past attacked the Indian 
military.140   
In the Maldives, the threat is political in that India fears extra-regional 
influence could unnecessarily pose a danger to its security.  It has therefore maintained 
good relations with the ruling elite, even coming to their aid in times of crisis.  This has 
thus far bought India the political capital necessary to retain its influence in the Maldives.  
This influence is important because the Maldives’s population is largely Muslim which 
contributes to the idea that India is capable of having good relations with Islamic 
countries, though it also contributes to the idea that India will be friendly so long as it can 
dominate.  
b. Threat to India and Its Navy 
For the most part, India’s smaller neighbors do not possess naval 
capabilities.  In some cases though, it is the lack of maritime capabilities that presents a 
threat.  India has worked more closely with Sri Lanka and the Maldives to increase their 
maritime security effectiveness.  The Sri Lankan government has been fighting an 
internal insurgency with the Tamils for the last several decades, which is a constant 
concern along India’s southern peninsula.141  The Sea Tigers represent a small, but very 
effective force which is responsible for the sinking of over 30 Sri Lankan vessels.  Jane’s 
Intelligence estimates suggest that Sea Tiger strength is around 2,000 personnel, with an 
additional 100-200 personnel in the Black Sea Tigers.142  The former are tasked with 
conducting smuggling and piracy operations along the Sri Lankan coast. The latter are 
tasked with suicide attacks along the Sri Lankan coast.  While the 2004 tsunami 
devastated the Sea Tigers, it has recently demonstrated its resurgent capabilities with an 
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attack on MV Pearl Cruise II.143  This presents a difficult task for India and its navy to 
balance its need to provide greater security to Sri Lanka without inciting its own Tamil 
population.   
In the Maldives, its small Coast Guard is faced with the difficult task of 
patrolling its vast EEZ with only a few vessels.  India has offered its support in order to 
maintain its good relations with its small neighbor, and in hope of preventing political 
subversion by extra-regional states such as China.  The Chinese leased Marao Island in 
1999 for maritime traffic management, but the island is also suspected of being used to 
monitor Indian and U.S. warships in the Indian Ocean.144  The Indian navy went so far as 
to donate a ship to retain its influence because the Maldives, which “sits astride some 
crucial sea lanes in the Indian Ocean,” and is “the cynosure of several countries vying for 
a foothold in the region.”145  This presents a difficult task for India and its navy to 
balance its security concerns without directly inciting Chinese opposition.  
In Bangladesh and Burma, the threat to India and its navy is most evident 
in the lack of effective governance which has translated into a lack of control over its 
maritime space.  This has created an area whereby terrorism, piracy and arms smuggling 
have increased.146   This causes a need for increased patrol of the Bay of Bengal by the 
Indian navy.   
3.  Persian Gulf States 
The security environment in South Asia has been significantly affected by events 
that occur in the Persian Gulf region and is therefore sensitive to its stability, or lack 
thereof.  Stephen Philip Cohen emphasized that “no other region on India’s periphery has 
been as critical and as frustrating” to Indian diplomats.147   
a.  Defining the Threat  
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This threat from the Persian Gulf region is political in that British-Indian 
influence was once the dominant power in the region.  After the British departed, India 
had hoped to step into its position, but this situation was complicated by the Indian 
partition and the oil nationalization crisis in Iran.  The Persian Gulf region is dominated 
by Muslims of either Arab or Persian origin.  India’s partition and its wars with a Muslim 
Pakistan have done little to aid in India’s ability to gain influence in the region.  In 
addition, the oil nationalization brought additional extra-regional actors into the Persian 
Gulf region.  While the British and Russians had been engaged in the region since the 
early part of the 20th century, the United States entry was facilitated by the 1951 oil 
nationalization crisis in Iran.148  The entry of the United States into Iran prevented India 
from assuming a more prominent role in the region and has since contributed to much of 
the instability associated with the region.   
The threat from the Persian Gulf region is also economic in that India is 
heavily dependent upon this region as a trading partner.149  India imports over 70 percent 
of its oil from this region.  Continued access to this region and its oil is therefore a vital 
interest to India.  India also has an estimated 3.5 million workers in the region, which 
provide valuable remittances and thereby requires New Delhi to consider its options in 
protecting its people and the flow of income.   
b. Threat to India and Its Navy 
The most significant threat to India and its navy in the Persian Gulf region 
comes from the Islamic Republic of Iran and its navy.  While it is also possible to utilize 
Iran’s air force to neutralize India’s entry into the Persian Gulf region, it is assumed that 
India would deal with this contingency separately.  Iran and India have shared good 
relations over the last several decades even involving India’s aid to its nuclear 
program,150 but India’s increased relations with the United States may provide the 
impetus for change.  According to a recent inquiry by an Indian expert, the Iranian navy 
consists of approximately one-third the number of personnel and roughly the same 
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number of naval combat ships, though Iran’s navy consists of more small patrol boats 
than larger combatants.151  The Iranian navy has suffered from years of sanctions and 
lack of funding from the Islamic regime.  Of the services, it has probably been the hardest 
hit by the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  It had previously shared good relations with the 
United States Navy and was dependent upon them for the acquisition of its ships.  
Thereafter, Iran was isolated and has until recently been unable to assert its power in the 
Gulf Region.  Only the aid of China and the Soviet Union has enabled Iran to develop a 
more capable naval arm.  While the quantitative difference is not significant, the 
qualitative difference between these two navies is extremely significant.   
Iran’s surface fleet is a modest and ineffective force when solely 
considering its major surface combatants, but when considering its enormous small boat 
fleet, it presents a significant threat to even the most advanced navies, should they 
approach the Iranian coast.  Its major surface combatants include only three Alvand-class 
and two PF-103 frigates, but it is supported by over 30 missile boats and 250 plus patrol 
boats.  Iran has introduced a swarming tactic into its maritime strategy because of its 
meager assets, but this has proven effective in the Persian Gulf region because its waters 
are not easily navigable, especially through the Strait of Hormuz.  In addition it has 
acquired a significant number of effective surface to surface missiles and rocket propelled 
grenade launchers which enhance the effectiveness of the numerous small boats that 
Iran’s navy possesses.  Because of Iran’s strategic decisions to pursue a small-boat force 
it is not capable of projecting a significant threat outside the Persian Gulf into the 
Arabian Sea.  
Iran’s submarine fleet has great potential to be a significant threat with 
three of the quietest submarines in the world and a few mini-submarines.  The three Kilo-
Class submarines were acquired in the early 1990’s from Russia, but its navy has been 
unable to develop the proficiency to employ them effectively.  Should Iran learn to 
operate the Kilo submarines properly, it could increase its capability vis-à-vis the Indian 
navy.  The three mini-submarines were developed or acquired with the help of North  
 
                                                 
151 R.S.N. Singh, Asian Strategic Military Perspective, Observer Research Foundation, 2005, 72 and 
101. 
53 
Korea and there are plans to build a few dozen in Iran.152  These submarines will 
probably be used for mine laying, but suicide missions are also possible given dire 
circumstances. 
The Iranian navy also possesses a small but proficient naval aviation 
component.  Of the six U.S. P-3’s, maybe two to three remain operational.153  These 
provide a maritime patrol capability throughout the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.  
Iranian naval aviation also includes five combat aircraft and 19 armed helicopters.    
In total, Iran’s naval capabilities present a significant threat to India and its 
navy within the confines of the Persian Gulf, but are less of a threat in the Arabian Sea.  
Should a conflict occur, and India finds it necessary to operate in the Persian Gulf, it will 
require significant planning to immobilize Iran’s navy and thereby reduce the threat in 
the Persian Gulf before it could conduct sustained operations. 
4.  Southeast Asian States 
The security environment in South Asia is not independent of Southeast Asia.  For 
geographical reasons, India has found that this region is important to its national security 
for two reasons.   First, it is important to India’s national security because during the last 
half century this region has been most turbulent due to extra-regional actors, which is 
something that India has been attempting to limit.  In order for India to be considered a 
“great power” it believes that it must provide the image of a nation in control of its 
security environment.  The attempts by extra-regional actors to get involved limit India’s 
credibility and thereby diminish its “great power” status.  For that reason, India has 
explored different avenues to cultivate its relationship with the countries of Southeast 
Asia to both improve the security environment and prevent extra-regional involvement.  
The second reason it is important to India’s national security is because this region 
provides the most efficient route between two emerging powers, China and India.  China 
has committed to increasing its relations in the region in order to provide increased 
access.  India, in recognition of this fact, was forced to counter with its own attempts to 
deny Chinese access to the region.   
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a.  Defining the Threat 
The threat to India and its navy from Southeast Asia is political in that 
Southeast Asia and specifically, the Strait of Malacca, is the most prevalent area in the 
world or maritime piracy.  A coalition of international users, to include the United States, 
Japan, China, and South Korea - has been more assertive in ensuring the security of this 
region in recent times.154  The Regional Maritime Security Initiative was advocated by 
this consortium to better provide security in the region.155  The three countries responded 
to this issue by committing to provide increased security which has resulted in their 
commitment to building up their naval capabilities.  India has found that it shares 
common interests with these countries in guaranteeing security of the vital shipping lanes 
and counterterrorism efforts with the countries of Southeast Asia.156  The Indian Chief of 
Naval Staff found this to be an area where the Indian Navy could be best utilized “to 
build partnerships by offering assistance in areas where we have expertise and cooperate 
in areas of commonality.”157  Many of these efforts have thus far been resisted because 
India is itself viewed as an extra-regional actor by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.   
The threat to India and its navy from Southeast Asia is also political in that 
there is a competition for influence in the region between China and India.  Southeast 
Asia has historically been called Indo-China for good reason.  It represents the overlap of 
those two great civilizations and contains the most efficient path to traverse by land 
between the two regions.  From the Indian perspective, the subcontinent is bordered by 
expansive mountain ranges to the north and west which discourage invasion even with 
today’s advanced technologies.  It is therefore important for India to maintain influence 
in Southeast Asia so long as there is a potential for conflict with China.  India has 
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attempted to emphasize this relationship since the 1990’s in order to contain Chinese 
influence in the region and thereby make China’s entry into South Asia more difficult. 
b. Threat to India and Its Navy 
This region presents two distinct threats to India and its navy.  The first is 
through the extra-regional involvement in response to the predominance of maritime 
piracy and terrorism.  The second is through the competition for influence in the region 
between China and India.  In order for India to ensure that extra-regional involvement is 
minimized, the region must become more secure, which presents two paths.  The first 
path, which requires less aid from India, involves the countries from within the region 
providing better security, which appears to be the preferred path for them.  The second 
path, which requires a more assertive effort by India, is for India to take responsibility of 
the strait’s security on its own, which as thus far been resisted by the Malaysia and 
Singapore.  In order to make the decision easier for India, this region has recently 
undergone a significant expansion of its naval capabilities to provide better security.158   
 
  
Figure 2.   Malacca Strait Security Areas.  (From: 
http://www.jinsa.org/documents/200507/3055.jpg) 
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Singapore has the most robust military capabilities in the vicinity of the 
strait, but is responsible for only a small portion of the strait’s security. (See Figure 2)  
According to an inquiry by RSN Singh, Singapore’s navy with 9,000 personnel, is 
roughly one-sixth the size of the Indian navy and with 23 ships, is roughly one-third the 
size of the Indian navy.159  Its overall defense budget represents about 5-6 percent, which 
has been relatively constant despite the Asian Financial crisis and the SARS threat.160  
The Royal Singapore Navy’s (RSN) surface fleet is fairly robust considering its small 
size.  It is composed of six corvettes, six gunboats, four tank landing ships, and four mine 
warfare ships.  This force has proven capable of patrolling Singapore’s section of the 
strait, but many of the ships are aging and so Singapore has committed to acquiring 
replacements over the next decade.  It has signed contracts with the French to acquire six 
Lafayette-class frigates, which will significantly enhance the overall capabilities of the 
Singapore navy. The RSN submarine fleet is also fairly robust considering Singapore’s 
small size.  It is composed of four Challenger–class diesel submarines which have been 
modified for operations in tropical waters.161  The RSN has ordered to more 
Vastergotland-class diesel submarines to further bolster its fleet.  
Malaysia contains a fairly small navy in relation to its sizeable maritime 
claims and perceived threats.  The Royal Malaysian Navy’s (RMN) is responsible for 
most of the eastern section of the strait security issue. (See Figure 2)  According to an 
inquiry by RSN Singh, Malaysia’s navy with 14,300 personnel, is roughly one-fourth the 
size of the Indian navy and with 53 naval combat ships, is roughly 72 percent the size of 
the Indian navy.162  Its overall defense budget represents only one percent of GDP.  This 
has not afforded it the funds necessary to acquire or develop a navy to provide adequate 
security to its area of responsibility.  The RMN’s surface fleet is composed of five 
frigates, six corvettes, six patrol vessels, eight missile boats, 27 small patrol craft and one 
amphibious vessel.   This is not a significant force given that it is responsible for most of 
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the eastern section of the Malacca strait.163  The RMN’s submarine fleet has yet to take 
shape.  Malaysia is set to acquire three new submarines from France by 2010, but these 
will take time to become operational and will probably not significantly contribute to the 
strait security issue.  The RMN’s aviation fleet consists of 6 Wasp HAS-1 helicopters 
which the potential to make a significant contribution to strait security if properly 
utilized.  In addition, Malaysia recently contracted to buy 12 more helicopters to bolster 
its overall capabilities and may provide increased security.  
Indonesia contains a fairly sizeable navy, but again is hindered by the 
extent of its maritime claims and its perceived threat environment, which dictates that its 
armed forces concentrate on internal security.  The Indonesian navy, or Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia - Angkatan Laut (TNI-AL), is responsible for the western section of the strait 
security issue, but has not been very effective as Indonesia remains the area of highest 
incidence for maritime piracy.164   
According to a current study by Cordesman and Kleiber, the TNI-AL 
contains 44,000 personnel, or roughly 80 percent the size of the Indian navy and has 65 
major combat ships, or roughly 90 percent the size of the Indian navy.165  According to 
the CIA World Fact Book, its overall defense budget is approximately three percent of 
GDP and has thus far proven quite insufficient to acquire or develop a navy to provide 
adequate security to its large area of responsibility, though this may be due to the level of 
corruption in government.166  The TNI-AL’s surface fleet is composed of 13 frigates, 16 
corvettes, four missile patrol boats, 19 small patrol boats, 11 mine warfare craft and over 
90 amphibious vessels.167   Though this force is fairly sizeable, it is divided into two 
geographic commands and the Malacca Strait issue has not historically been a priority, 
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though this has recently changed due to international pressure.  The TNI-AL is 
responsible for most of the western section of the Malacca strait’s security and yet its 
navy is spread thinly through this region due to this problem’s ranking in relation to 
Indonesia’s other perceived threats.168  In its effort to modernize, the TNI-AL has 
contracted to buy four Sigma-class corvettes which are scheduled to be delivered between 
2007-2009.169  The TNI-AL submarine fleet is composed of two Type-209 diesel 
submarines.  The TNI-AL has contracted to buy two more in the next few years, but these 
will take time to become operational and will probably not significantly contribute to the 
strait security issue.  The TNI-AL’s aviation fleet consists of 6 CN-235 maritime patrol 
aircraft which have the potential to make a significant contribution to strait security, but 
are currently utilized in the Jakarta region and therefore provide no added capability.170  
In total, the recent naval arms buildup by Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia has the potential to increase the security in the Malacca strait and thereby 
prevent extra-regional involvement, but only if there is a concerted effort within each 
country to accord priority to this issue.  The Indian navy has offered to aid in training and 
cooperation, but the offer has been resisted since the Indians are viewed in much the 
same way as other extra-regional actors.  While this does not contribute to India’s ability 
to secure its periphery, it does contribute to its attempts to limit Chinese influence in the 
region.   
5. China 
While Pakistan competes with India for power in South Asia, it does not share a 
maritime boundary in South Asia primarily serves as a competitor in greater Asia.  India 
and China represent two of the most durable civilizations yet produced by humanity.   
Both were reshaped following World War II and both have emerged as economic and 
political giants in there respective spheres.  The most significant issue between these two 
nations is an outstanding disagreement over a border region in the highlands of 
Himalayas which provides the strategic access points between these two great nations.  A 
war was fought in 1962 and the humiliation in that war has been difficult to put aside for 
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the Indians.  China has also serves as the primary supporter of India’s chief antagonist, 
Pakistan, in the development of nuclear weapons and this could also explain a certain 
amount of animosity between India and China.  Long term security and stability in Asia 
is only feasible through more cooperation than conflict between these two great powers.    
a.  Defining the Threat 
The threat from China is most easily defined as historical and political in 
character.  Much of the conflict and competition between these two countries arises out 
of these two categories.  The threat from China is historical in that, both these countries 
were great civilizations that emerged from lengthy phases of colonial domination around 
the same period and being both young and vulnerable nations, they perceived each other 
as the greatest threats because of their history as great civilizations. China was the first to 
make a move in the 1950’s, conquering the Tibetan region which had historic ties to India 
and thereafter provided for a common border, which thereby increased the potential for 
conflict.  That conflict came in 1962 with the Indian defeat serving to humiliate a 
generation of India and has left an indelible mark on the Indian psyche.  This has not 
been easily discarded by Indian leaders of today, especially given the military 
modernization of China.  
The threat from China is also political in that, competition for political 
dominance in Asia exists between these two countries.   For that reason, India and China 
have embarked upon a strategic competition for influence in Asia which has resulted in 
many of the security problems in Asia.  This theory best explains China’s attempts to 
contain India in South Asia by aiding Pakistan as well as its movement to influence 
events in South East Asia, which has contributed to the Indian perception of ‘strategic 
encirclement’ by China.171  The end result is a classical security dilemma in which moves 
by either side are determined to be inimical to the other.  This security dilemma has 
contributed to speculation by some analysts of an inevitable conflict between India and 
                                                 
171 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the 20th Century, University of 
Washington Press, 2001, 5.  
60 
China.172  This issue is addressed in India’s 2004 Maritime Doctrine where it asserts that 
“a certain threshold of capability is therefore required, which will make the cost of 
intervention sufficiently high” and therefore discourage China’s extra-regional 
involvement.173  India is therefore resigned to resist Chinese influence in the IOR which 
has increased recently.  Two particular areas of interest are along Pakistan’s Makran 
Coast in the Northern Arabian Sea and a few island territories throughout the IOR.174 
b. Threat to India and Its Navy 
For the purpose of assessing the threat to India and its navy posed by 
China, it is necessary to examine its respective naval capabilities.  According to 
Cordesman and Kleiber, the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the third largest in 
the world, behind the Soviet Union and the United States.  It is roughly five times the size 
of the Indian navy in terms of personnel and almost two times the size of the Indian navy 
in terms of major combat ships.175  China possesses both a quantitative and qualitative 
advantage over the Indian navy, but is also plagued by a distinct disadvantage in 
geography in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).  China’s only direct access into the region 
is through the Malacca strait or via the southern Indonesian straits of Sunda or Lombok.  
The first route has been fortified by the Indian navy’s development of the Andaman 
Nicobar Command which sits overlooking the mouth of the Strait of Malacca in the Bay 
of Bengal.  The second route is much more distant but offers an access that is not 
immediately secured by the Indian navy.  In either case, the distance required to engage 
the Indian navy significantly alters the quantity and quality of combatants that the PLA 
Navy would be capable of utilizing, and thereby, provides for a more balanced equation 
in a naval conflict in the IOR.  One particular reason the PLA Navy has been able to 
grow so extensively is that it receives roughly 24 percent of the defense budget in relation 
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to the Indian navy’s 12 percent, plus China’s defense budget is twice the size of the 
Indian’s.  In addition it is suspected that China’s actual defense expenditures may even be 
in excess of those that are released.  As a result, the PLA Navy has been provided with 
more funds to develop its maritime capabilities than that of the Indian navy.   
The PLA Navy is an effective coastal defense force that is attempting to 
transition to a blue-water “active offshore defense” force.176  Its surface fleet, much like 
Pakistan’s, is mostly comprised of aging ships, 20-30 years old, which have been 
modified and upgraded over time.177  In total it represents more than 900 naval combat 
ships.178  The PLA Navy does contain a few surface ships that are of newer design and 
represent a significant threat to the Indian navy.  It acquired two Russian Sovremennyy-
class guided missile destroyers in 2000-01 which are fitted with one of the most lethal 
sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles in the world, the SS-N-22 “Sunburn”.  In addition, 
China’s investment in a shipbuilding industry has recently paid dividends by producing 
several types of destroyers that are publicized as China’s “Aegis equivalent.”179  The 
trouble for the PLA Navy’s surface forces would be gaining access to the Indian Ocean 
and then providing support while they operate there. 
The PLA Navy’s submarine arm is mostly composed of aging platforms as 
well; but they represent the full spectrum of submarine warfare with diesel and nuclear 
propulsion in addition to two ballistic missile submarines.  China has also invested in the 
shipbuilding industry for submarines which has also paid dividends.  They have 
indigenously produced three classes of submarines – the Song, Yuan and Jin - that will 
have increased capability over the ones in their current inventory and further increases 
the qualitative advantage that China possesses over the Indian navy.    In total, the PLAN 
submarine force is estimated at 75 in relation to India’s 19 submarines, but with an 
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increasingly higher number coming into service every year, they could soon be over 
100.180  Again, the trouble for the PLA Navy’s submarine forces would be gaining access 
to the Indian Ocean and providing support while they there.  
The PLA Navy does have a large naval air arm with over 400 aircraft, but 
consists of only 4 maritime patrol aircraft and 8 ASW helicopters.181  This capability 
does not provide a significant advantage relative to the Indian navy, unless China can 
arrange a more forward position, or the Indian navy conducts more routine operations in 
the Chinese EEZ.   And while India has operated an aircraft carrier group since the early 
1960’s, China is still developing its first carrier.  Fortunately, due to the Taiwan scenario 
it is faced with, the Chinese have developed a capability by land-based aircraft to conduct 
over water missions.  This would again require forward basing options to support.   
In total, the PLA navy has the potential to be a much superior naval force 
than India’s, but it must overcome the constraints of access and distance to even engage 
in the IOR.  The Indian navy has recognized these as potential weaknesses and has 
worked to make Chinese access even more difficult by rebuffing its attempts to establish 
forward bases in Burma, Bangladesh and Pakistan.  The continued development of the 
PLA Navy as a power projection force into the Southeast Asian region increases the 
likelihood for conflict between India and China in the future.   
6. United States 
The security environment has been routinely degraded due to involvement by the 
United States.  India blames the U.S. involvement in the region for the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and for the subsequent spread of Islamic fundamentalism into South Asia.  
The United States, in the Cold War, did much to contain India’s rise as it was viewed as 
one of the Soviet Union’s client states.  The United States did this through its aid to 
Pakistan, which utilized that aid to fight its proxy war.  After the conclusion of the Cold 
War, the United States made attempts to dehyphenate its relations with India and Pakistan 
and thereby help India break free of its previous mold, but close relations with the United 
States were not immediately attractive to Indian politicians, since India’s populace 
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remained reticent to fully cooperate with the United States.  This reticence has been 
slowly eroded and India and the United States are “turning a corner”182 with a long term 
goal of creating a strategic alliance through what is terms a “global partnership.”183  As 
long as this relationship continues to develop along that path, the United States will 
become less of a challenge to India and more of an enabler.  And this is something that 
would drastically alter India’s security environment.   
a.  Defining the Threat 
The threat from the United States has been mostly political in nature, 
though at times it has taken an economic form.  The United States viewed India as a Cold 
War antagonist and sponsored Pakistan to contain India politically.184  Though this did 
also have some economic ramifications, India’s economic stagnancy has been more 
related to its internal economic policies, which have been slowly reformed to create a 
more open and expansive economy.  India’s political containment by the United States 
ended with the Cold War, though its relations with the United States did not immediately 
change.  In the aftermath of the nuclear demonstrations by India and Pakistan in 1998, the 
United States placed sanctions on both nations.  The events of 9/11 removed much of the 
animosity that remained as India and the United States began to see that their national 
interests were starting to converge.  This brings us to the current period, in which the 
United States has become less of a challenger and more of an enabler to India’s security 
environment.   
b. Threat to India and Its Navy 
The United States navy is the largest navy in the world according to gross 
tonnage.185  In numerical terms, United States navy contains almost 350,000 personnel, 
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which is roughly seven times the size of the Indian navy and 298 “battle force ships,”  
 
which is almost three times the size of the Indian navy.186  The United States navy 
possesses an overwhelming qualitative and quantitative advantage in almost every 
respect.  
The United States navy’s surface force has seen no equal since World War 
II.  Even the Soviet Union’s Navy paled in comparison.  The United States surface navy 
is composed of 12 aircraft carriers, which provide the central focus of its ability to project 
power across the globe and perform a wide variety of missions.  Each of the Carrier 
Strike Groups (CSG) consist of a carrier and its embarked air wing, one guided missile 
cruiser, two guided missile destroyers, an attack submarine and one resupply ship.187   Its 
surface navy also contains an expeditionary element.  The 12 amphibious assault ships 
provide the central focus of the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) which is composed of 
an amphibious assault ship and its embarked air wing, an amphibious transport dock ship, 
a dock landing ship, a guided missile cruiser, a guided missile destroyer, a frigate, and an 
attack submarine.188  In combination, this provides the United States Navy a capability to 
perform a wide variety of operations in both the open ocean as well as the littoral 
environment.   
The United States Navy’s submarine force is an extremely capable force 
as well.  According to the US Navy’s homepage it contains 57 nuclear attack submarines, 
seven ballistic missile nuclear submarines, and four guided missile nuclear submarines. 
This force is capable of performing a wide variety of missions, from peacetime 
engagement, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, special operations, precision strike 
sea denial or deterrence.189   
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The United States Navy’s aviation arm is a critical component of the 
navy’s ability to conduct operations across the globe.    It is composed of over 4000 
operational aircraft that cover a wide variety of warfare disciplines.190  This operational 
capability is one that separates medium power navies and global power navies which the 
Indian navy still aspires to become.   
C. NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS 
The non-traditional threat to India and its navy is contained in the manifestation 
of threats that are not representative of the dominant international system, but rather are a 
manifestation of sub-national entities.  These threats represent three categories: terrorism, 
piracy, and smuggling.  One additional category, natural disasters, is also significant 
because of their prevalence in South Asia and the extent of the damage that may occur 
with each incidence.  All of these categories represent threats which require planned 
responses.  These planned responses can become more efficient and effective with 
increased operational capabilities and experience.     
1. Terrorism 
In recognition of this emergent threat, the Indian defense leadership recently 
ordered the Indian navy to take a more proactive stance against terrorist activities in the 
Indian Ocean.191  India also set up a study group, led by B. Raman, to study the activities 
of international terrorist organizations in order to better define the threat to Indian 
national security.  He recently presented a paper of the findings at a conference on 
National Security in a Changing Environment.192  In this paper, he helps define maritime 
terrorism acts in order to differentiate it from criminal maritime activities.  It also 
identifies geographic areas of concern for India.  While these threats are likely identified 
on the basis of the persistent conflict between India and certain elements that reside in its 
neighboring states, this report is specific and represents the most definitive view of the 
threat of maritime terrorism.  In short, it identifies three areas of concern: Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh.  These areas are also identified in a U.S. report which suggests 
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that there is significant cooperation on this issue.193  The Indian report also mentions the 
acts of terrorism along the Red Sea coast, but ties those acts to Al Qaeda, which they 
connect to Pakistan.  The area of the Red Sea could be further expanded to include the 
Horn of Africa, which the United States regards as presenting a significant terrorist 
threat.194  The Indian study concludes that the threat from maritime terrorism demands a 
unique set of skills to deal with a “larger gamut of issues” than are traditionally used to 
ensure maritime security.  These issues include intelligence collection, analysis and 
assessment, physical security measures required to prevent maritime terrorism, crisis 
management to deal with successful attacks, a decision-making apparatus to deal with 
maritime terrorism, training syllabi and methods.   
In addition to those threat areas identified by B. Raman’s study group, there are 
several other areas of interest to the Indian navy.  These areas present significant 
challenges for the Indian navy because India does not currently play a significant role in 
the maritime security of these regions.  The first area is the Malacca Strait, which 
connects India to Southeast Asia and the Pacific which holds enormous trade importance 
and if interrupted could devastate India’s economy.  The second area is the Strait of 
Hormuz, which connects India to the Middle East which holds enormous energy supplies 
and could also devastate India’s economy if interrupted.  
In order to effectively respond to the emergent threat of maritime terrorism to its 
homeland, the Indian navy must implement significant change in its organization.  Most 
of its naval ports are shared with that of commercial ports which explains India’s recent 
movement of its major naval bases to more secure locations.195  This measure will 
increase the security of its navy by making it more difficult to gain access to its ports.  
In order to effectively respond to the threat of maritime terrorism in the Indian 
Ocean region, India will require greater coordination of regional states.  This threat is not 
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one that will be defeated by a single country.  One area where countries can improve 
coordination is through training exercises.  Counter-terrorism training is reflected in the 
Indian navy’s most recent exercises with the United States and will likely be included in 
its future exercises with regional countries as well.196  
2. Piracy 
Piracy remains one of the chief threats to maritime security in the region for India 
and its navy.197  According to the most recent International Maritime Organization 
report, the IOR remains the most prevalent area of piracy in the world with the Horn of 
Africa and Bangladesh being the emergent hotspots.198 The Strait of Malacca and the 
Indonesian archipelago also remain areas of concern for piracy for the Indian navy.  
While the number of incidents along the Indian coast have been drastically reduced since 
reaching a ten-year high in 2003, this threat must be looked at from a regional perspective 
because of its ability to harm India’s economic and political interests by portraying an 
insecure environment which is counter to India’s rise to great power status.  The Indian 
navy made attempts to deter maritime piracy in key areas outside its coastal region, 
especially in the post-9/11 period, but these were largely rebuffed by its littoral neighbors 
which view the Indian navy’s patrolling as attempts by India to dominate the entire 
region.  This resentment has decreased in the presence of increased pressure by other 
extra-regional actors such as Japan and the United States to increase security in the 
Malacca Strait.  This came about as a result of a series of incidents in 2004 whereby two 
Japanese merchant ships were attacked.  The United States and Japan both pressured the 
surrounding countries to increase security and this has led to a greater acceptance of 
Indian participation.199 
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There are certain capabilities which the Indian navy requires to effectively 
respond to the threat of piracy.  First, it must have an ability to regularly patrol the 
regions of concern, whether by surface or air.  The most important aspect is simply 
visibility.  The presence of effective security patrols will ultimately diminish the number 
of incidents.   This active presence is best achieved by deploying units to the region of 
concern.  For the Malacca Strait, the Andaman Nicobar Command serves this purpose.  
The Indian navy is not as well positioned for combating piracy in the Horn of Africa 
region.  It has conducted lengthy operations there for security reasons, but these cannot 
be sustained indefinitely without additional basing options in the areas of concern.       
3. Smuggling 
 
Figure 3.   Major Maritime Smuggling Routes in South Asia (From: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:HeroinWorld.png) 
 
The 2002 Annual Defense Report highlights the smuggling of narcotics and small 
arms as threats to India’s internal security environment.  The areas for smuggling of these 
types of goods are most common along the Golden Crescent, which is located in the Gulf 
of Oman, and the Golden Triangle, which is located in the Bay of Bengal. (See Figure 3)  
The threat from narcotics is well known and universal.  The threat from the proliferation 
of small arms is less well known, because its application is not universal.  India suffers 
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from a series of persistent conflicts on its borders, and these weapons prolong that 
conflict by making their resistance more effective.   Cutting off the supply of weapons 
would diminish the resistance.  Another type of smuggling, which the United States has 
emphasized, while urging India to do likewise, is the smuggling of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD).  The United States has identified North Korea, Iran and Syria as 
proliferators of WMD,200 so the most direct sea routes between these countries could be 
viewed as a start to greater definition of these areas of concern.  India lies directly along 
the sea route between North Korea and Iran and could therefore provide valuable service 
to this endeavor should its leadership decide it lies within India’s interests.  Given the 
intensity of terrorist attacks in India as of late, and the North Korean history of aiding 
Pakistan, this decision has likely already been made.  This is likely the reason for India’s 
recent detainment of a North Korean merchant ship in its waters.201   
In order to counter the threat of smuggling the Indian navy requires extensive 
maritime surveillance capabilities to not only track vessels but also identify which are 
potentially smuggling illicit materials.  This is especially difficult in the IOR because 
maritime traffic is so dense.  
4. Natural Disasters 
The destruction of the 2004 tsunami was considerable.  The Indian navy’s 
response was incredible, but as the Indian Defense Minister claims, it needs to improve 
its response because the IOR is so “prone to [natural] disasters.”202  In this region, one 
can almost set the clock by them.  The four seasons arrive and depart in tandem with four 
major kinds of natural disasters: floods, earthquakes, cyclones, and droughts.  In response 
to the 2004 tsunami, the Indian navy identified two critical requirements for an effective 
response.203  The first requirement is the need for efficient and effective operational and 
logistics planning processes.  Crisis response must be orderly or else it only contributes to 
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the chaos of the already tense environment.  The second requirement is the need for 
increased airlift and sea lift to enable more rapid response of the relief effort.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The overall threat to India and its navy has expanded in the current era.  The 
Indian navy is tasked with countering a diverse set of traditional and non-traditional 
threats which require an increasingly complex set of capabilities.  In order to counter its 
traditional threats, the Indian navy will require a blue-water force oriented toward sea 
control of the Indian Ocean.  This will serve two purposes: first, it will demonstrate 
Indian power to prevent extra-regional intervention; and second, it will provide India 
with the necessary capabilities to respond to the wide spectrum of operations and crises 
that are required as the dominant maritime power in the IOR.  In response to its non-
traditional threats, the Indian navy must also become more oriented toward littoral 
operations, or a green-brown water navy.  This will serve two purposes: first, it will 
provide India with an expeditionary capability to better conduct interdiction operations 
that are required in response to some of the non-traditional threats, and second, it will 
enable the Indian navy to better respond to emergent crises in times of natural disaster, 
when airlift and sealift serve as the primary enabler of effective response.  Given the 
duality of its needs, the Indian navy of the future must be properly structured to respond 
to this diverse set of threats.   
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VI.  UNLOCKING INDIAN MARITIME CAPABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An important part of the formulation of strategy is the determination of one’s 
capability to satisfy its purposes or to thwart the aims of others.204  This chapter serves to 
examine India’s maritime capabilities in order to determine if it’s overall maritime 
capabilities are expanding.  Maritime capabilities are defined for this study as India’s 
overall naval capabilities, economic capabilities, industrial capabilities and technological 
capabilities. If India’s strategic expansion is best explained by an expansion of its 
maritime capabilities, it will contribute to a strategy that can emphasize its strengths. 
B. NAVAL CAPABILITIES 
Naval capabilities are foundational to any maritime strategy.  They include the 
proper organization and force structure of a navy to achieve the nation’s objectives.   
While capability does guarantee success, miscalculating in this area almost guarantees 
failure.   
1. Organization 
According to Mahan, the quality and organization of a nation’s ports represented 
one of the defining elements of the sea power of a nation.  India has historically 
maintained two primary surface fleets, one on the east coast at Vishakapatnam and one 
on the west coast at Mumbai.  The location of these bases coincided with major 
population centers and provided India with greater security from attacks on those areas.  
It did maintain several small bases along its coast to provide strategic depth, and to 
defend the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.  In 1991, India expanded upon this idea to 
include a more forward defense of the Bay of Bengal through the establishment of the 
Andaman Nicobar Command, which took advantage of the islands strategic location in 
the eastern approaches to the Bay of Bengal.  This new command enabled India to 
respond to emergent threats from an encroaching China and yet also enabled it to better 
provide security for the key choke point of that region, the Strait of Malacca.  At that 
time, this strategic shift was not pursued in the Arabian Sea due to the absence of 
considerable threats as well as the absence of island territory in the Arabian Sea.    
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The Indian navy’s basing organization for naval aviation is not as strategically 
placed, but it does possess adequate facilities to provide strategic depth.  Its main naval 
aviation base, INS Hansa is at Goa, approximately 250 miles south of Mumbai, and 
houses the Sea Harrier squadrons that embark aboard its only operational aircraft carrier.  
This base is expected to be the home of the MIG-29’s once India’s newest carrier, INS 
Vikramaditya, becomes operational.205  There are seven additional naval aviation bases 
that serve the Eastern Fleet, Southern Fleet and Andaman and Nicobar Commands, but 
these mainly house helicopters at present.  If India remains committed to a three carrier 
navy with one in each fleet, it may need to undergo a reorganization to facilitate the 
basing of aircraft carrier squadrons in each area.   
In response to emergent threats, India’s current organizational strategy is 
undergoing a transformation.  In the aftermath of the series of terrorist attacks, India has 
sought to reduce the access to these maritime ports, while still maintaining their strategic 
locations.  As a result, the Indian navy has sought to separate its civilian and military 
installations.  It has therefore attempted to modify its basing arrangements at Mumbai and 
Vishakapatnam in addition to inducting a new base, INS Kadamba, at Karwar in the 
south of India.  This will also create three commands whereby aircraft carrier basing is a 
possibility.  In total, this will provide the Indian navy with improved strategic depth and 
security as well as adding a “very considerable flexibility in operations.”206     
2. Surface Fleet 
The Indian navy’s surface fleet is quantitatively superior to any other in the Indian 
Ocean totaling over 130 naval combat ships.207  This number represents both the combat 
and support aspect of the Indian fleet, and though many of these units are 20-30 years 
old, they remain effective because they have conducted considerable upgrades.208  The  
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Indian navy’s new Chief of Naval Staff highlighted that the fleet will require additional 
units to be procured in the near future though as they are currently decommissioning 
more units than they are inducting.209   
Of the 130 naval combat ships, only 113 are actually intended to conduct combat 
operations.  Within that sub-group there are a select few that really possess the capability 
to project power.  The Indian navy currently operates one aircraft carrier on its west 
coast, but has plans to operate up to three carriers in the future.210  This operational plan 
will be more possible with the transformation of its organizational structure and the 
creation of the new base at Karwar.  The former Russian Carrier Gorshkov, INS 
Vikramaditya, is likely to be commissioned by 2008 and will be based on the east coast 
initially.211  The completion of its first indigenous aircraft carrier is not expected until 
2012.   
The Indian navy currently operates two different classes of guide missile 
destroyers totaling eight units with a third class in the development and construction 
phase.212  The completion of the Kolkata-class destroyers would add three additional 
units by 2012 bringing the total number to 11 units.  Of these units, the Delhi-class 
destroyers are the most capable, providing the Indian navy with a multi-mission 
capability.  The Indian navy also operates three different classes of guided missile 
frigates totaling nine units with two more classes in the acquisition and construction 
phase.213  The Talwar and Brahmaputra-class frigates both possess a multi-warfare 
capability with extremely advanced anti-ship cruise missiles.  India signed a contract for 
Russia to provide three units of its newest modified Talwar class by 2012 which will 
                                                 
209 “Navy’s Shrinking Submarine Fleet a Concern: Chief”, 
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200611060314.htm (Accessed November 2006).  
210 “India to Have 3-Carrier Navy”, 
http://deccanherald.com/deccanherald/nov152006/national2344220061114.asp (Accessed November 
2006).  
211 Ibid.  
212 Bharat Rakshak, “The Surfce Fleet”, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Surface.html 
(Accessed November 2006).  
213 Ibid.   
74 
likely be armed with the Brahmos anti-ship cruise missile.   The Shivalik-class guided 
missile frigate is the Indian navy’s stealth frigate and will add an additional three units by 
2008.  The Indian navy also currently operates three different classes of guided missile 
corvettes totaling 20 units with one more class in the construction phase.214   
Of the 130 naval combat ships, 17 are intended for troop transport.  These 
represent the expeditionary sea lift capability of the Indian navy, which was recently 
utilized in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami as part of the relief operations.  This event 
highlighted to the Indian leadership the significant role that amphibious forces could play 
and has served to also highlight the need to increase its overall capability to support 
operations of this sort in the IOR.  The Indian navy has therefore committed to increasing 
its overall amphibious capability, which prompted the purchase of the American 
amphibious vessel Trenton.  This acquisition will significantly enhance India’s troop 
carrying capacity.215  In addition, the Indian navy recently commissioned an indigenous 
amphibious unit built at the INS Shardul at the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers 
in Kolkata.216  An additional two units of this same class are expected to be 
commissioned into the Indian navy by 2007.  These units are capable of carrying up to 
200 troops for a longer duration or 500 for short duration.   
The Indian navy has proven itself capable in times of crisis, as shown during the 
2004 tsunami, but the overall surface fleet will likely increase in size and complexity as 
India continues to pursue its blue-water navy, especially given its increased emphasis on 
indigenous production.   As India becomes more self-sufficient it will not require as 
many foreign acquisitions, and this will inevitably be more cost-efficient as well.   
3. Submarine Arm 
The Indian navy’s submarine fleet is of considerable size in relation to its Indian 
Ocean neighbors, but pales in comparison to the PLA Navy’s submarine fleet.  The 
Indian navy’s submarine arm currently consists of three classes of diesel submarines 
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totaling 16 units with an additional two classes of submarines in the development and 
acquisition phase.217  Of those in service, the Kilo-class submarine is the most capable, 
being one of the quietest submarines in the world, and outfitted with advanced weapons, 
including the Klub-S anti-ship cruise missile and a shoulder-launched surface to air 
missile.218  India has contracted for six French Scorpene-class submarines, with the first 
arriving in 2012.  It is also constructing its first nuclear submarine and though slow in its 
development, it is scheduled to complete five units by 2020.  These units will add a new 
dimension for the Indian navy and could be a significant factor in India’s overall nuclear 
strategy.219  The new Navy Chief, Admiral Mehta, has mentioned the aging fleet as a 
concern, which may signal that it will increase its funding for additional acquisitions to 
forestall a significant drop in the overall force numbers.220  
4. Naval Air Arm 
The Indian navy’s aviation arm is also of considerable size in relation to its Indian 
Ocean neighbors, but is vastly outnumbered by the PLA Navy’s aviation arm.  The Indian 
navy’s aviation arm consists of more than 125 helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.221  The 
Indian navy’s fighter force is fairly lean with 15 Sea Harriers and an additional 5 dual-
seat Sea Harrier trainers.  The Indian navy recently purchased 16 MIG-29K advanced 
fighter aircraft to be utilized aboard the INS Vikramaditya which will significantly 
enhance the qualitative capabilities of the Indian navy’s fighter component.222  These are 
expected to be delivered by 2008.  The Indian navy’s helicopter wing is fairly robust, 
totaling more than 91 units which conduct a variety of missions to include search and 
rescue, maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare.  An additional six Sea-King 
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helicopters were included in the purchase of the USS Trenton and will further enhance 
India’s capabilities.223  The Indian navy also possesses 20 maritime patrol aircraft, but 
most are obsolete and in need of upgrade or replacement.  The Indian navy held a 
competition in April 2006 in hopes of acquiring an additional 30 aircraft by 2020.224  The 
acquisition of up to 30 aircraft with advanced capabilities could bolster its maritime 
surveillance capabilities and reduce the need for surface patrols in its EEZ.  The Indian 
navy appears committed to the expansion and indigenization of its naval aviation wing 
which will provide it with increased coverage of the Indian Ocean and could significantly 
alter its maritime strategy.  
C.  ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES 
The Indian navy budget allocation has historically been the least of the three 
armed services due to the perceived threat from the sea and the service’s overall size in 
relation to the other armed services.  Its budget traditionally hovered between 11-13 
percent throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, but it has since increased to 17.6 percent with 
an aim point of 20 percent.225  The growth in the annual expenditure is important given 
the navy’s ambitious plans for expansion and indigenization.226  The overall growth in 
the Indian economy also provides a significant growth in the Indian navy’s budget.  If 
this economic growth can be sustained, the Indian navy will be much more capable of 
pursuing aggressive acquisition and development programs and thereby increase its 
overall naval capabilities.   
D. INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES 
The Indian navy has never been capable of producing the equipment necessary to 
sustain itself and has therefore been heavily reliant upon foreign acquisitions.  India’s 
indigenous production capabilities have been a national interest since its independence, 
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but have historically been lackluster.227   Despite its failures, India has remained 
committed to this industry.  In the aftermath of the 1990’s economic crisis and the fall of 
India’s leading defense supplier, India committed to become more self-reliant.  This has 
been slow in coming, but appears to be paying dividends.  The Indian Prime Minister and  
 
the new Navy Chief appear committed to improving its indigenous production 
capabilities.228  In an effort to overcome its past problems, the Indian navy has even set 
up a new directorate to ensure its success.229   
India has seven primary shipyards which are responsible for the construction and 
repair of Indian navy ships.230  The shipyard Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) of Mumbai 
is capable of constructing surface ships as well as submarines.  MDL is currently 
constructing three Delhi-class destroyers, three Shivalik-class stealth frigates and will be 
responsible for the construction of six Scorpene-class submarines.  Garden Reach 
Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) of Kolkata is responsible for the construction of 
some of India’s larger surface ships.  GRSE is currently constructing three large Shardul-
class landing ship tanks and four Project-28 anti-submarine warfare corvettes.  Goa 
Shipyard Limited (GSL) of Mormugao is capable of constructing small patrol vessels, but 
has recently committed to the construction of next-generation vessels such as hovercraft 
and mine-countermeasure vessels.231  GSL is currently constructing three offshore patrol 
vessels for the Indian navy.  Cochin Shipyard is responsible for the construction and 
repair of India’s carrier force.  It is currently constructing the first indigenously produced 
aircraft carrier in India, the Air Defence Ship, as well as a dozen fast attack craft for the 
Indian navy.  Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) at Vishakapatnam is primarily 
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responsible for repairs to India’s submarine fleet, but also has a significantly diverse 
shipbuilding capability.232  HSL is currently tasked with the midlife refit of India’s Kilo-
class submarines.  India’s two remaining shipyards, the ABG Shipyard Limited of Surat 
and Ratnagiri Shipyard Limited of Mumbai, are tasked with mostly the production of 
civilian bulk carriers and tugs, but have produced several small patrol craft and offshore 
patrol vessels in the past.  In addition, INS Kadamba, the Indian navy’s newest base at  
 
Karwar, now has the capability to conduct ship repairs with a new dry-dock facility that 
can repair ships up to 10,000 tons and will alleviate some of the congestion of the other 
ship repair yards.   
In total, India’s indigenous production capability is undergoing reform to provide 
greater efficiency and increasing in size.  It has been characterized as “one of the largest 
and most significant indigenous production capabilities in the developing world.”233  
This increased capability will undoubtedly benefit the Indian navy’s ability to replace its 
aging fleet more efficiently and may also provide India with an export capacity that 
would further serve to bolster India’s economic prowess.   
E.  TECHNOLOGIC CAPABILITIES 
India is a country that has not historically been associated with the leaders of 
technology, but its IT sector is now booming.  In much the same way, for most of the 
history of the Indian navy, its ships and weapons systems were not constructed through 
its own technologic prowess, but it has since developed itself into a multi-dimensional 
force with an equally impressive array of sensors and weaponry.  This process began in 
2001 when the Indian defense leadership, realizing the potential impact that technology 
can have on operations, actively called for greater improvement in this area.234  The 
Indian navy sought to break down its historical barriers to become a leading producer of 
naval technology.  And while it remains a long way from being a leading producer, it is 
taking steps in the right direction.  Its shipbuilding industry has acquired the capability to 
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construct a wide array of surface ships, submarines and is currently attempting an aircraft 
carrier in an effort to join an elite club.  While as many as nine countries are capable of 
operating a carrier, only a select few have proven capable of constructing these 
technological behemoths.  In addition, India recently announced its ability to produce 
nuclear warships, though the decision to construct ships of this type has not been made 
yet.235  The Indian leadership also recognized the need for its surface ships, submarines 
and aircraft to be interconnected to be more effective in operations at war or peace.  It has 
therefore committed to achieving “seamless connectivity and secure communication 
exchange.”236 The Indian navy is also committed to becoming more self-reliant in its 
weapons industry and their efforts have bore fruit.  Its Brahmos missile is an extremely 
advanced weapon system and calls have been made for the Indian navy to corner the 
market with this missile which can be launched from surface ships, submarines, aircraft, 
or on land and can be utilized against targets at sea or on land.   
In some areas the Indian navy has made progress in creating a more advanced 
naval force by developing the technological prowess and thereby enabling it to compete 
on the world markets, but it remains on the fringe in many other areas.  In order for India 
to become more self-reliant and also become more competitive in the global arms 
industry, continued investment in this sector will be required.  This is more possible now 
than it has been in the past, especially given India’s economic success, but its success 
will depend on its ability to master the remaining areas of the naval defense industry.   
F. CONCLUSIONS 
The Indian navy’s overall capabilities are certainly expanding in the current era.  
It has developed into a well-rounded maritime force capable of conducting a wide array 
of operations in a peacetime or wartime environment.  Its organizational structure is 
becoming more effective and adding strategic depth in areas where it has found itself 
vulnerable.  The surface, submarine and naval aviation arms, though aging, remain 
qualitatively and quantitatively superior to any other in the IOR.  India has committed to 
upgrading its aging naval units which will provide greater longevity while it has 
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committed to the acquisition and development of new naval forces and weapons systems.  
Its commitment to self-reliance has seen a new surge and this could provide India with 
the long term ability to remain qualitatively and quantitatively superior to its Indian 
Ocean neighbors.  It is important to highlight that the Indian navy does not possess a 
qualitative or quantitative advantage over the Chinese navy and this will weigh heavily 
on its strategy.   The Indian navy’s shortcomings were highlighted during the 2004 
tsunami with its lack of a robust sea-lift capability.  It will also require a significant 
commitment to developing its technologic capabilities to achieve greater 
interconnectedness within its naval forces.  In order to overcome these deficiencies, India 
will seek to leverage its economic success to achieve greater self-reliance in indigenous 
production and technology.  India’s rise to become a great power is not assured but its 
commitment to these areas will go a long way to helping it achieve its objectives.   
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VII.  UNLOCKING INDIAN MARITIME STRATEGY 
The continued development of the Indian navy’s maritime strategy toward greater 
ambition and capability appears certain in line with the continued expansion of its 
interests, threats and force structure.  The periods of greatest expansion occurred during 
eras in which all three variables simultaneously expanded.   This occurred during two 
eras – the era of military buildup and the era of economic liberalization.  It was in these 
periods that the Indian navy and its maritime strategy underwent its most significant 
change.  These two periods were followed by a period of reduced growth.  In the current 
era, the international system, and the United States in particular, appear to have embraced 
India’s rise. India has finally become a contender for major power status in the 
international community in an economic, political and military sense.  This has initiated a 
significant expansion of all three of the elements of Indian maritime strategy and will 
almost certainly lead to maritime expansion.   
India’s national interests have expanded as it assumes its role as a rising power.   
Its survival interests remain largely the same, with China and Pakistan as the chief threats 
to its survival, but it has also come to recognize that the unity of its population is 
extremely important, especially given the predominance of ethnic and religious conflict 
in South Asia.  It therefore takes attempts to divide India’s population much more 
seriously than it has in the past.  India’s vital interests and major interests are undergoing 
a period of rapid expansion primarily due to the coincidental expansion of its perceived 
area of influence.  This has fundamentally changed its outlook and could foreshadow 
increased sensitivity to extra-regional involvement along its strategic periphery.    
India’s perceived threats have also expanded in the current period.  While the 
traditional threat from China and Pakistan remain a concern, the non-traditional threat has 
assumed greater importance than it has in the past.  The need for India to respond this 
threat is becoming more apparent and yet it has not been able to identify the best means 
to respond to that threat.  India remains committed to maintaining This again presages 
Indian sensitivity, but may not necessarily be restricted to India’s periphery.   
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India’s naval capabilities are also expanding in the current period which enables it 
to provide a greater contribution to its national interests.  Its navy has become the fifth 
largest navy in the world and may seek to play a more proactive role in regional security.  
While its naval capabilities have expanded, it remains vulnerable in many places.    In 
particular its aging fleet will require a plan to maintain its current strength or risk the 
chance that an extra-regional actor will once again seek to gain influence in the region.   
India’s maritime strategy will clearly result in expansive development of its navy 
for the foreseeable future.  Its current maritime strategy will not be accomplished for 
another 10-15 years, in which time India will be certainly faced with new challenges and 
circumstances.  Barring a war against a major power, India appears capable of securing 
its national interests and responding to its traditional threats through its blue-water 
strategy.  This strategy will also give it the needed legitimacy of a rising power.  Where 
the blue-water strategy falls short is in response to the non-traditional threats it faces.  
This challenge will require a significant brown or green water capability.  India will 
ultimately need to commit greater resources to provide a multi-dimensional force capable 
of responding to the diverse threat categories presented in the Indian Ocean Region. 
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